1 citations · 2 across the 15 of their papers we have counts for
14 papers · 1 filter
Coopshift: Post-Training Amplifies The Memory Curse In LLM Cooperation
Jiayuan Liu, Shiyi Du, Tianqin Li +3
How does post-training change cooperation during repeated interaction? Within each of seven released model lineages, we compare pretrained (Base), supervised fine-tuned (SFT), and…
What You Earn from What You Learn: Characterization and Complexity of the Value of Information
Ratip Emin Berker, Ioannis Anagnostides, Emanuel Tewolde +3
We examine the value of information in extensive-form decision problems: the largest multiplicative gain that a decision maker can obtain from an information refinement, taken over…
Do LLMs Take Care of Their Own? Similarity Signals Can Induce Cooperation
Akash Kundu, Emanuel Tewolde, Ratip Emin Berker +2
As LLM-based agents with user-instructed goals are becoming widely deployed, they increasingly encounter each other in strategic interactions, and face challenges of finding mutual…
CoopEval: Benchmarking Cooperation-Sustaining Mechanisms and LLM Agents in Social Dilemmas
Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita +2
It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reason…
Decision Making under Imperfect Recall: Algorithms and Benchmarks
Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides +2
In game theory, imperfect-recall decision problems model situations in which an agent forgets information it held before. They encompass games such as the ``absentminded driver'' a…
On the Edge of Core (Non-)Emptiness: An Automated Reasoning Approach to Approval-Based Multi-Winner Voting
Ratip Emin Berker, Emanuel Tewolde, Vincent Conitzer +3
Core stability is a natural and well-studied notion for group fairness in multi-winner voting, where the task is to select a committee from a pool of candidates. We study the setti…
Convergence of Regret Matching in Potential Games and Constrained Optimization
Ioannis Anagnostides, Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang +3
Regret matching (RM) -- and its modern variants -- is a foundational online algorithm that has been at the heart of many AI breakthrough results in solving benchmark zero-sum games…
The Complexity of Equilibrium Refinements in Potential Games
Ioannis Anagnostides, Maria-Florina Balcan, Kiriaki Fragkia +3
The complexity of computing equilibrium refinements has been at the forefront of algorithmic game theory research, but it has remained open in the seminal class of potential games;…
Expected Variational Inequalities
Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides, Emanuel Tewolde +4
Variational inequalities (VIs) encompass many fundamental problems in diverse areas ranging from engineering to economics and machine learning. However, their considerable expressi…
Computing Game Symmetries and Equilibria That Respect Them
Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld +2
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also…
The Value of Recall in Extensive-Form Games
Ratip Emin Berker, Emanuel Tewolde, Ioannis Anagnostides +2
Imperfect-recall games, in which players may forget previously acquired information, have found many practical applications, ranging from game abstractions to team games and testin…
Imperfect-Recall Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Their Complexity
Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld +4
We investigate optimal decision making under imperfect recall, that is, when an agent forgets information it once held before. An example is the absentminded driver game, as well a…
The Computational Complexity of Single-Player Imperfect-Recall Games
Emanuel Tewolde, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer +1
We study single-player extensive-form games with imperfect recall, such as the Sleeping Beauty problem or the Absentminded Driver game. For such games, two natural equilibrium conc…
Game Transformations That Preserve Nash Equilibria or Best-Response Sets
Emanuel Tewolde, Vincent Conitzer
In this paper, we investigate under which conditions normal-form games are (guaranteed to be) strategically equivalent. First, we show for N-player games (N >= 3) that (A) it is NP…