10 citations · 11 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Choosing What Game to Play without Selecting Equilibria: Inferring Safe (Pareto) Improvements in Binary Constraint Structures
Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
We consider a setting in which a principal gets to choose which game from some given set is played by a group of agents. The principal would like to choose a game that favors one o…
AI Testing Should Account for Sophisticated Strategic Behaviour
Vojtech Kovarik, Eric Olav Chen, Sami Petersen +2
This position paper argues for two claims regarding AI testing and evaluation. First, to remain informative about deployment behaviour, evaluations need account for the possibility…
Maximizing Social Welfare with Side Payments
Ivan Geffner, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
We examine normal-form games in which players may \emph{pre-commit} to outcome-contingent transfers before choosing their actions. In the one-shot version of this model, Jackson an…
Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI
Lewis Hammond, Alan Chan, Jesse Clifton +41
The rapid development of advanced AI agents and the imminent deployment of many instances of these agents will give rise to multi-agent systems of unprecedented complexity. These s…
An Interpretable Automated Mechanism Design Framework with Large Language Models
Jiayuan Liu, Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
Mechanism design has long been a cornerstone of economic theory, with traditional approaches relying on mathematical derivations. Recently, automated approaches, including differen…
Characterising Simulation-Based Program Equilibria
Emery Cooper, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
In Tennenholtz's program equilibrium, players of a game submit programs to play on their behalf. Each program receives the other programs' source code and outputs an action. This c…