activity
20212026
most citedImperfect-Recall Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Their Complexity

1 citations · 2 across the 19 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

23 papers

cs.CL2026

On the LLM Verification for Argument Graph Generation

Jakub Bąba, Jarosław A. Chudziak

Multi-agent LLM systems can formalize natural-language argumentation end-to-end, turning plain text into structured graphs by classifying components, connecting them with relations…

cs.GT2026

Coopshift: Post-Training Amplifies The Memory Curse In LLM Cooperation

Jiayuan Liu, Shiyi Du, Tianqin Li +3

How does post-training change cooperation during repeated interaction? Within each of seven released model lineages, we compare pretrained (Base), supervised fine-tuned (SFT), and…

cs.GT2026

What You Earn from What You Learn: Characterization and Complexity of the Value of Information

Ratip Emin Berker, Ioannis Anagnostides, Emanuel Tewolde +3

We examine the value of information in extensive-form decision problems: the largest multiplicative gain that a decision maker can obtain from an information refinement, taken over…

cs.GT2026

Do LLMs Take Care of Their Own? Similarity Signals Can Induce Cooperation

Akash Kundu, Emanuel Tewolde, Ratip Emin Berker +2

As LLM-based agents with user-instructed goals are becoming widely deployed, they increasingly encounter each other in strategic interactions, and face challenges of finding mutual…

cs.CL2026

The Memory Curse: How Expanded Recall Erodes Cooperative Intent in LLM Agents

Jiayuan Liu, Tianqin Li, Shiyi Du +7

Context window expansion is often treated as a straightforward capability upgrade for LLMs, but we find it systematically fails in multi-agent social dilemmas. Across 7 LLMs and 4…

cs.GT2026

Incentive-Aware Multi-Fidelity Optimization for Generative Advertising in Large Language Models

Jiayuan Liu, Barry Wang, Jiarui Gan +4

Generative advertising in large language model (LLM) responses requires optimizing sponsorship configurations under two strict constraints: the strategic behavior of advertisers an…

cs.GT2026

CoopEval: Benchmarking Cooperation-Sustaining Mechanisms and LLM Agents in Social Dilemmas

Emanuel Tewolde, Xiao Zhang, David Guzman Piedrahita +2

It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reason…

cs.GT2026

Decision Making under Imperfect Recall: Algorithms and Benchmarks

Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides +2

In game theory, imperfect-recall decision problems model situations in which an agent forgets information it held before. They encompass games such as the ``absentminded driver'' a…

cs.GT2026

How Many Votes is a Lie Worth? Measuring Strategyproofness through Resource Augmentation

Ratip Emin Berker, Vincent Conitzer, Eden Hartman +2

It is well known, by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, that when there are more than two candidates, any non-dictatorial voting rule can be manipulated by untruthful voters. But h…

cs.GT2025

On the Edge of Core (Non-)Emptiness: An Automated Reasoning Approach to Approval-Based Multi-Winner Voting

Ratip Emin Berker, Emanuel Tewolde, Vincent Conitzer +3

Core stability is a natural and well-studied notion for group fairness in multi-winner voting, where the task is to select a committee from a pool of candidates. We study the setti…

cs.GT2025

Convergence of Regret Matching in Potential Games and Constrained Optimization

Ioannis Anagnostides, Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang +3

Regret matching (RM) -- and its modern variants -- is a foundational online algorithm that has been at the heart of many AI breakthrough results in solving benchmark zero-sum games…

cs.GT2025

Designing Rules to Pick a Rule: Aggregation by Consistency

Ratip Emin Berker, Ben Armstrong, Vincent Conitzer +1

Given a set of items and a set of evaluators who all individually rank them, how do we aggregate these evaluations into a single societal ranking? Work in social choice and statist…

cs.GT2025

Expected Variational Inequalities

Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides, Emanuel Tewolde +4

Variational inequalities (VIs) encompass many fundamental problems in diverse areas ranging from engineering to economics and machine learning. However, their considerable expressi…

cs.GT2025

Computing Game Symmetries and Equilibria That Respect Them

Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld +2

Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also…

cs.GT2025

From Independence of Clones to Composition Consistency: A Hierarchy of Barriers to Strategic Nomination

Ratip Emin Berker, Sílvia Casacuberta, Isaac Robinson +3

We study two axioms for social choice functions that capture the impact of similar candidates: independence of clones (IoC) and composition consistency (CC). We clarify the relatio…

stat.ML2025

Learning and Computation of -Equilibria at the Frontier of Tractability

Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides, Emanuel Tewolde +4

-equilibria -- and the associated notion of -regret -- are a powerful and flexible framework at the heart of online learning and game theory, whereby enriching the set of dev…

cs.GT2024

The Value of Recall in Extensive-Form Games

Ratip Emin Berker, Emanuel Tewolde, Ioannis Anagnostides +2

Imperfect-recall games, in which players may forget previously acquired information, have found many practical applications, ranging from game abstractions to team games and testin…

cs.GT2024★ 1 cited

The Complexity of Computing Robust Mediated Equilibria in Ordinal Games

Vincent Conitzer

Usually, to apply game-theoretic methods, we must specify utilities precisely, and we run the risk that the solutions we compute are not robust to errors in this specification. Ord…

cs.GT2024★ 1 cited

Imperfect-Recall Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Their Complexity

Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld +4

We investigate optimal decision making under imperfect recall, that is, when an agent forgets information it once held before. An example is the absentminded driver game, as well a…

cs.GT2024

Computing Optimal Equilibria in Repeated Games with Restarts

Ratip Emin Berker, Vincent Conitzer

Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by re…

cs.LG2024

Social Choice Should Guide AI Alignment in Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback

Vincent Conitzer, Rachel Freedman, Jobst Heitzig +9

Foundation models such as GPT-4 are fine-tuned to avoid unsafe or otherwise problematic behavior, such as helping to commit crimes or producing racist text. One approach to fine-tu…

cs.GT2023

Steering No-Regret Learners to a Desired Equilibrium

Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides +7

A mediator observes no-regret learners playing an extensive-form game repeatedly across rounds. The mediator attempts to steer players toward some desirable predetermined equil…

cs.GT2021

Game Transformations That Preserve Nash Equilibria or Best-Response Sets

Emanuel Tewolde, Vincent Conitzer

In this paper, we investigate under which conditions normal-form games are (guaranteed to be) strategically equivalent. First, we show for N-player games (N >= 3) that (A) it is NP…