10 citations · 11 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for
13 papers
Choosing What Game to Play without Selecting Equilibria: Inferring Safe (Pareto) Improvements in Binary Constraint Structures
Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
We consider a setting in which a principal gets to choose which game from some given set is played by a group of agents. The principal would like to choose a game that favors one o…
AI Testing Should Account for Sophisticated Strategic Behaviour
Vojtech Kovarik, Eric Olav Chen, Sami Petersen +2
This position paper argues for two claims regarding AI testing and evaluation. First, to remain informative about deployment behaviour, evaluations need account for the possibility…
Maximizing Social Welfare with Side Payments
Ivan Geffner, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
We examine normal-form games in which players may \emph{pre-commit} to outcome-contingent transfers before choosing their actions. In the one-shot version of this model, Jackson an…
Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI
Lewis Hammond, Alan Chan, Jesse Clifton +41
The rapid development of advanced AI agents and the imminent deployment of many instances of these agents will give rise to multi-agent systems of unprecedented complexity. These s…
An Interpretable Automated Mechanism Design Framework with Large Language Models
Jiayuan Liu, Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
Mechanism design has long been a cornerstone of economic theory, with traditional approaches relying on mathematical derivations. Recently, automated approaches, including differen…
Characterising Simulation-Based Program Equilibria
Emery Cooper, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
In Tennenholtz's program equilibrium, players of a game submit programs to play on their behalf. Each program receives the other programs' source code and outputs an action. This c…
Observation Interference in Partially Observable Assistance Games
Scott Emmons, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer +1
We study partially observable assistance games (POAGs), a model of the human-AI value alignment problem which allows the human and the AI assistant to have partial observations. Mo…
Can CDT rationalise the ex ante optimal policy via modified anthropics?
Emery Cooper, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
In Newcomb's problem, causal decision theory (CDT) recommends two-boxing and thus comes apart from evidential decision theory (EDT) and ex ante policy optimisation (which prescribe…
Aggregating Quantitative Relative Judgments: From Social Choice to Ranking Prediction
Yixuan Even Xu, Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng +1
Quantitative Relative Judgment Aggregation (QRJA) is a new research topic in (computational) social choice. In the QRJA model, agents provide judgments on the relative quality of d…
Game Theory with Simulation in the Presence of Unpredictable Randomisation
Vojtech Kovarik, Nathaniel Sauerberg, Lewis Hammond +1
AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this q…
Now, Later, and Lasting: Ten Priorities for AI Research, Policy, and Practice
Eric Horvitz, Vincent Conitzer, Sheila McIlraith +1
Advances in artificial intelligence (AI) will transform many aspects of our lives and society, bringing immense opportunities but also posing significant risks and challenges. The…
Recursive Joint Simulation in Games
Vojtech Kovarik, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
Game-theoretic dynamics between AI agents could differ from traditional human-human interactions in various ways. One such difference is that it may be possible to accurately simul…
Non-Excludable Bilateral Trade Between Groups
Yixuan Even Xu, Hanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer
Bilateral trade is one of the most natural and important forms of economic interaction: A seller has a single, indivisible item for sale, and a buyer is potentially interested. The…