10 citations · 12 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers · 1 filter
How Many Votes is a Lie Worth? Measuring Strategyproofness through Resource Augmentation
Ratip Emin Berker, Vincent Conitzer, Eden Hartman +2
It is well known, by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, that when there are more than two candidates, any non-dictatorial voting rule can be manipulated by untruthful voters. But h…
Choosing What Game to Play without Selecting Equilibria: Inferring Safe (Pareto) Improvements in Binary Constraint Structures
Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
We consider a setting in which a principal gets to choose which game from some given set is played by a group of agents. The principal would like to choose a game that favors one o…
Maximizing Social Welfare with Side Payments
Ivan Geffner, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
We examine normal-form games in which players may \emph{pre-commit} to outcome-contingent transfers before choosing their actions. In the one-shot version of this model, Jackson an…
Promises Made, Promises Kept: Safe Pareto Improvements via Ex Post Verifiable Commitments
Nathaniel Sauerberg, Caspar Oesterheld
A safe Pareto improvement (SPI) [41] is a modification of a game that leaves all players better off with certainty. SPIs are typically proven under qualitative assumptions about th…
Computing Game Symmetries and Equilibria That Respect Them
Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld +2
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also…
Characterising Simulation-Based Program Equilibria
Emery Cooper, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
In Tennenholtz's program equilibrium, players of a game submit programs to play on their behalf. Each program receives the other programs' source code and outputs an action. This c…
Imperfect-Recall Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Their Complexity
Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld +4
We investigate optimal decision making under imperfect recall, that is, when an agent forgets information it once held before. An example is the absentminded driver game, as well a…
Computing Optimal Commitments to Strategies and Outcome-Conditional Utility Transfers
Nathaniel Sauerberg, Caspar Oesterheld
Prior work has studied the computational complexity of computing optimal strategies to commit to in Stackelberg or leadership games, where a leader commits to a strategy which is o…