10 citations · 12 across the 14 of their papers we have counts for
15 papers
A dataset of rated conceptual arguments
Emery Cooper, Caspar Oesterheld, Linh Chi Nguyen +2
Large language models have improved rapidly on tasks with verifiable answers, such as mathematics and programming. Much less is known about their ability to reason about what we ca…
Implementing surrogate goals for safer bargaining in LLM-based agents
Caspar Oesterheld, Maxime Riché, Filip Sondej +2
Surrogate goals have been proposed as a strategy for reducing risks from bargaining failures. A surrogate goal is goal that a principal can give an AI agent and that deflects any t…
How Many Votes is a Lie Worth? Measuring Strategyproofness through Resource Augmentation
Ratip Emin Berker, Vincent Conitzer, Eden Hartman +2
It is well known, by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, that when there are more than two candidates, any non-dictatorial voting rule can be manipulated by untruthful voters. But h…
Choosing What Game to Play without Selecting Equilibria: Inferring Safe (Pareto) Improvements in Binary Constraint Structures
Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
We consider a setting in which a principal gets to choose which game from some given set is played by a group of agents. The principal would like to choose a game that favors one o…
Maximizing Social Welfare with Side Payments
Ivan Geffner, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
We examine normal-form games in which players may \emph{pre-commit} to outcome-contingent transfers before choosing their actions. In the one-shot version of this model, Jackson an…
Promises Made, Promises Kept: Safe Pareto Improvements via Ex Post Verifiable Commitments
Nathaniel Sauerberg, Caspar Oesterheld
A safe Pareto improvement (SPI) [41] is a modification of a game that leaves all players better off with certainty. SPIs are typically proven under qualitative assumptions about th…
Computing Game Symmetries and Equilibria That Respect Them
Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld +2
Strategic interactions can be represented more concisely, and analyzed and solved more efficiently, if we are aware of the symmetries within the multiagent system. Symmetries also…
Multi-Agent Risks from Advanced AI
Lewis Hammond, Alan Chan, Jesse Clifton +41
The rapid development of advanced AI agents and the imminent deployment of many instances of these agents will give rise to multi-agent systems of unprecedented complexity. These s…
Characterising Simulation-Based Program Equilibria
Emery Cooper, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
In Tennenholtz's program equilibrium, players of a game submit programs to play on their behalf. Each program receives the other programs' source code and outputs an action. This c…
Observation Interference in Partially Observable Assistance Games
Scott Emmons, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer +1
We study partially observable assistance games (POAGs), a model of the human-AI value alignment problem which allows the human and the AI assistant to have partial observations. Mo…
Can CDT rationalise the ex ante optimal policy via modified anthropics?
Emery Cooper, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
In Newcomb's problem, causal decision theory (CDT) recommends two-boxing and thus comes apart from evidential decision theory (EDT) and ex ante policy optimisation (which prescribe…
A dataset of questions on decision-theoretic reasoning in Newcomb-like problems
Caspar Oesterheld, Emery Cooper, Miles Kodama +2
We introduce a dataset of natural-language questions in the decision theory of so-called Newcomb-like problems. Newcomb-like problems include, for instance, decision problems in wh…
Imperfect-Recall Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Their Complexity
Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld +4
We investigate optimal decision making under imperfect recall, that is, when an agent forgets information it once held before. An example is the absentminded driver game, as well a…
Recursive Joint Simulation in Games
Vojtech Kovarik, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
Game-theoretic dynamics between AI agents could differ from traditional human-human interactions in various ways. One such difference is that it may be possible to accurately simul…
Computing Optimal Commitments to Strategies and Outcome-Conditional Utility Transfers
Nathaniel Sauerberg, Caspar Oesterheld
Prior work has studied the computational complexity of computing optimal strategies to commit to in Stackelberg or leadership games, where a leader commits to a strategy which is o…