5 citations · 18 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
9 papers
A Theory of Bounded Inductive Rationality
Caspar Oesterheld, Abram Demski, Vincent Conitzer
The dominant theories of rational choice assume logical omniscience. That is, they assume that when facing a decision problem, an agent can perform all relevant computations and de…
Incentivizing honest performative predictions with proper scoring rules
Caspar Oesterheld, Johannes Treutlein, Emery Cooper +1
Proper scoring rules incentivize experts to accurately report beliefs, assuming predictions cannot influence outcomes. We relax this assumption and investigate incentives when pred…
The Computational Complexity of Single-Player Imperfect-Recall Games
Emanuel Tewolde, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer +1
We study single-player extensive-form games with imperfect recall, such as the Sleeping Beauty problem or the Absentminded Driver game. For such games, two natural equilibrium conc…
Game Theory with Simulation of Other Players
Vojtech Kovarik, Caspar Oesterheld, Vincent Conitzer
Game-theoretic interactions with AI agents could differ from traditional human-human interactions in various ways. One such difference is that it may be possible to simulate an AI…
A Note on the Compatibility of Different Robust Program Equilibria of the Prisoner's Dilemma
Caspar Oesterheld
We study a program game version of the Prisoner's Dilemma, i.e., a two-player game in which each player submits a computer program, the programs are given read access to each other…
Similarity-based cooperative equilibrium
Caspar Oesterheld, Johannes Treutlein, Roger Grosse +2
As machine learning agents act more autonomously in the world, they will increasingly interact with each other. Unfortunately, in many social dilemmas like the one-shot Prisoner's…
For Learning in Symmetric Teams, Local Optima are Global Nash Equilibria
Scott Emmons, Caspar Oesterheld, Andrew Critch +2
Although it has been known since the 1970s that a globally optimal strategy profile in a common-payoff game is a Nash equilibrium, global optimality is a strict requirement that li…
A New Formalism, Method and Open Issues for Zero-Shot Coordination
Johannes Treutlein, Michael Dennis, Caspar Oesterheld +1
In many coordination problems, independently reasoning humans are able to discover mutually compatible policies. In contrast, independently trained self-play policies are often mut…
Formalizing Preference Utilitarianism in Physical World Models
Caspar Oesterheld
Most ethical work is done at a low level of formality. This makes practical moral questions inaccessible to formal and natural sciences and can lead to misunderstandings in ethical…