69 citations · 423 across the 56 of their papers we have counts for
31 papers · 1 filter
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers
Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with *passive* block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards e…
When Bidders Are DAOs
Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden
In a typical decentralized autonomous organization (DAO), people organize themselves into a group that is programmatically managed. DAOs can act as bidders in auctions, with a DAO'…
A Myersonian Framework for Optimal Liquidity Provision in Automated Market Makers
Jason Milionis, Ciamac C. Moallemi, Tim Roughgarden
In decentralized finance ("DeFi"), automated market makers (AMMs) enable traders to programmatically exchange one asset for another. Such trades are enabled by the assets deposited…
Are You Smarter Than a Random Expert? The Robust Aggregation of Substitutable Signals
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
The problem of aggregating expert forecasts is ubiquitous in fields as wide-ranging as machine learning, economics, climate science, and national security. Despite this, our theore…
Strictly Proper Contract Functions Can Be Arbitrage-Free
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
We consider mechanisms for truthfully eliciting probabilistic predictions from a group of experts. The standard approach -- using a proper scoring rule to separately reward each ex…
From Proper Scoring Rules to Max-Min Optimal Forecast Aggregation
Eric Neyman, Tim Roughgarden
This paper forges a strong connection between two seemingly unrelated forecasting problems: incentive-compatible forecast elicitation and forecast aggregation. Proper scoring rules…