activity
20062023
most citedLearning Simple Auctions

69 citations · 423 across the 56 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

67 papers

cs.GT2023★ 2 cited

Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers

Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden

The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with *passive* block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards e…

cs.GT2023

When Bidders Are DAOs

Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden

In a typical decentralized autonomous organization (DAO), people organize themselves into a group that is programmatically managed. DAOs can act as bidders in auctions, with a DAO'…

q-fin.MF2023★ 16 cited

Automated Market Making and Arbitrage Profits in the Presence of Fees

Jason Milionis, Ciamac C. Moallemi, Tim Roughgarden

We consider the impact of trading fees on the profits of arbitrageurs trading against an automated market maker (AMM) or, equivalently, on the adverse selection incurred by liquidi…

cs.DC2023★ 6 cited

Permissionless Consensus

Andrew Lewis-Pye, Tim Roughgarden

Blockchain protocols typically aspire to run in the permissionless setting, in which nodes are owned and operated by a large number of diverse and unknown entities, with each node…

cs.GT2023★ 5 cited

A Myersonian Framework for Optimal Liquidity Provision in Automated Market Makers

Jason Milionis, Ciamac C. Moallemi, Tim Roughgarden

In decentralized finance ("DeFi"), automated market makers (AMMs) enable traders to programmatically exchange one asset for another. Such trades are enabled by the assets deposited…

math.FA2023★ 2 cited

Complexity-Approximation Trade-offs in Exchange Mechanisms: AMMs vs. LOBs

Jason Milionis, Ciamac C. Moallemi, Tim Roughgarden

This paper presents a general framework for the design and analysis of exchange mechanisms between two assets that unifies and enables comparisons between the two dominant paradigm…