13 citations · 17 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers
Beyond Winner-Take-All Procurement Auctions
Pranav Garimidi, Michael Neuder, Tim Roughgarden
Blockchain protocols often seek to procure computationally challenging work from a decentralized set of participants. While there are simple procurement auctions that result in the…
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design for Leaderless Blockchain Protocols
Pranav Garimidi, Lioba Heimbach, Tim Roughgarden
We initiate the study of transaction fee mechanism design for blockchain protocols in which multiple block producers contribute to the production of each block. Our contributions i…
Toward Optimal-Complexity Hash-Based Asynchronous MVBA with Optimal Resilience
Jovan Komatovic, Joachim Neu, Tim Roughgarden
Multi-valued validated Byzantine agreement (MVBA), a fundamental primitive of distributed computing, allows processes to agree on a valid -bit value, despite faulty p…
Collusion-Resilience in Transaction Fee Mechanism Design
Hao Chung, Tim Roughgarden, Elaine Shi
Users bid in a transaction fee mechanism (TFM) to get their transactions included and confirmed by a blockchain protocol. Roughgarden (EC'21) initiated the formal treatment of TFMs…
Centralization in Block Building and Proposer-Builder Separation
Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden
The goal of this paper is to rigorously interrogate conventional wisdom about centralization in block-building (due to, e.g., MEV and private order flow) and the outsourcing of blo…
Utilitarian Algorithm Configuration
Devon R. Graham, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Tim Roughgarden
We present the first nontrivial procedure for configuring heuristic algorithms to maximize the utility provided to their end users while also offering theoretical guarantees about…