activity
20222025
most citedSequential Information Design: Learning to Persuade in the Dark

3 citations · 4 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

6 papers

cs.CC20261 cited

The Complexity of Min-Max Optimization with Product Constraints

Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni

We study the computational complexity of the problem of computing local min-max equilibria of games with a nonconvex-nonconcave utility function . From the work of Daskalakis, S…

cs.LG2025

Online Learning in the Random Order Model

Martino Bernasconi, Andrea Celli, Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi +3

In the random-order model for online learning, the sequence of losses is chosen upfront by an adversary and presented to the learner after a random permutation. Any random-order in…

cs.GT2025

The Complexity of Correlated Equilibria in Generalized Games

Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli +1

Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization -equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in mu…

cs.GT2025

Single-dimensional Contract Design: Efficient Algorithms and Learning

Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli

We study a Bayesian contract design problem in which a principal interacts with an unknown agent. We consider the single-parameter uncertainty model introduced by Alon et al. [2021…

cs.LG20231 cited

Bandits with Replenishable Knapsacks: the Best of both Worlds

Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli +1

The bandits with knapsack (BwK) framework models online decision-making problems in which an agent makes a sequence of decisions subject to resource consumption constraints. The tr…

cs.LG20223 cited

Sequential Information Design: Learning to Persuade in the Dark

Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi +2

We study a repeated information design problem faced by an informed sender who tries to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. We consider settings where the receive…