3 citations · 6 across the 27 of their papers we have counts for
15 papers · 1 filter
Regret Minimization in Single-Dimensional Contract-Design with Binary Actions
Riccardo Poiani, Martino Bernasconi, Andrea Celli
We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme (i.e., a contract) in order to induce an agent to take a costly action leading…
Nonparametric Contextual Online Bilateral Trade
Emanuele Coccia, Martino Bernasconi, Andrea Celli
We study the problem of contextual online bilateral trade. At each round, the learner faces a seller-buyer pair and must propose a trade price without observing their private valua…
Optimal Rates for Feasible Payoff Set Estimation in Games
Annalisa Barbara, Riccardo Poiani, Martino Bernasconi +1
We study a setting in which two players play a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, while a learner observes only their actions and has no knowledge of the e…
The Complexity of Correlated Equilibria in Generalized Games
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli +1
Correlated equilibria -- and their generalization -equilibria -- are a fundamental object of study in game theory, offering a more tractable alternative to Nash equilibria in mu…
Single-dimensional Contract Design: Efficient Algorithms and Learning
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli
We study a Bayesian contract design problem in which a principal interacts with an unknown agent. We consider the single-parameter uncertainty model introduced by Alon et al. [2021…
Improved Hardness Results for Min-Max Optimization with Coupled Constraints
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli +1
We investigate the computational complexity of min-max optimization under coupled constraints. The work of Daskalakis, Skoulakis, and Zampetakis [DSZ21] was the first to study min-…
Feature-Based Online Bilateral Trade
Solenne Gaucher, Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni +2
Bilateral trade models the problem of facilitating trades between a seller and a buyer having private valuations for the item being sold. In the online version of the problem, the…
Agent-Designed Contracts: How to Sell Hidden Actions
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli
We study the problem faced by a service provider that has to sell services to a user. In our model the service provider proposes various payment options (a menu) to the user which…
Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions
Federico Cacciamani, Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni +1
We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. Unlike previous work, we consider a general setting in which each agent has an arbitrary number of actions, an…
Regret-Minimizing Contracts: Agency Under Uncertainty
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi
We study the fundamental problem of designing contracts in principal-agent problems under uncertainty. Previous works mostly addressed Bayesian settings in which principal's uncert…
No-Regret Learning in Bilateral Trade via Global Budget Balance
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli +1
Bilateral trade models the problem of intermediating between two rational agents -- a seller and a buyer -- both characterized by a private valuation for an item they want to trade…
Persuading Farsighted Receivers in MDPs: the Power of Honesty
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi +1
Bayesian persuasion studies the problem faced by an informed sender who strategically discloses information to influence the behavior of an uninformed receiver. Recently, a growing…
Optimal Rates and Efficient Algorithms for Online Bayesian Persuasion
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli +3
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the on…
Constrained Phi-Equilibria
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi +2
The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to c…
Last-iterate Convergence to Trembling-hand Perfect Equilibria
Martino Bernasconi, Alberto Marchesi, Francesco Trovò
Designing efficient algorithms to find Nash equilibrium (NE) refinements in sequential games is of paramount importance in practice. Indeed, it is well known that the NE has severa…