3 citations · 6 across the 27 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers · 1 filter
Improved Hardness Results for Min-Max Optimization with Coupled Constraints
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli +1
We investigate the computational complexity of min-max optimization under coupled constraints. The work of Daskalakis, Skoulakis, and Zampetakis [DSZ21] was the first to study min-…
Feature-Based Online Bilateral Trade
Solenne Gaucher, Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni +2
Bilateral trade models the problem of facilitating trades between a seller and a buyer having private valuations for the item being sold. In the online version of the problem, the…
Beyond Primal-Dual Methods in Bandits with Stochastic and Adversarial Constraints
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli +1
We address a generalization of the bandit with knapsacks problem, where a learner aims to maximize rewards while satisfying an arbitrary set of long-term constraints. Our goal is t…
No-Regret is not enough! Bandits with General Constraints through Adaptive Regret Minimization
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli
In the bandits with knapsacks framework (BwK) the learner has resource-consumption (packing) constraints. We focus on the generalization of BwK in which the learner has a set o…
Agent-Designed Contracts: How to Sell Hidden Actions
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Andrea Celli
We study the problem faced by a service provider that has to sell services to a user. In our model the service provider proposes various payment options (a menu) to the user which…
Multi-Agent Contract Design beyond Binary Actions
Federico Cacciamani, Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni +1
We study hidden-action principal-agent problems with multiple agents. Unlike previous work, we consider a general setting in which each agent has an arbitrary number of actions, an…
Regret-Minimizing Contracts: Agency Under Uncertainty
Martino Bernasconi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi
We study the fundamental problem of designing contracts in principal-agent problems under uncertainty. Previous works mostly addressed Bayesian settings in which principal's uncert…