9 citations · 20 across the 16 of their papers we have counts for
16 papers
The Limits of Price Discrimination with a Bayesian Seller
Yuan Deng, Yilin Li, Wei Tang +1
We study the limits of third-degree price discrimination when the production cost is Bayesian and private to the seller, generalizing the seminal work of Bergemann, Brooks and Morr…
No-Regret Online Autobidding Algorithms in First-price Auctions
Yuan Deng, Yilin Li, Wei Tang +1
Automated bidding to optimize online advertising with various constraints, e.g. ROI constraints and budget constraints, is widely adopted by advertisers. A key challenge lies in de…
Approximately Efficient Bilateral Trade with Samples
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Balasubramanian Sivan +2
We study the social efficiency of bilateral trade between a seller and a buyer. In the classical Bayesian setting, the celebrated Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem states…
Non-uniform Bid-scaling and Equilibria for Different Auctions: An Empirical Study
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni +2
In recent years, the growing adoption of autobidding has motivated the study of auction design with value-maximizing auto-bidders. It is known that under mild assumptions, uniform…
Efficiency of the Generalized Second-Price Auction for Value Maximizers
Yuan Deng, Mohammad Mahdian, Jieming Mao +3
We study the price of anarchy of the generalized second-price auction where bidders are value maximizers (i.e., autobidders). We show that in general the price of anarchy can be as…
Multi-channel Autobidding with Budget and ROI Constraints
Yuan Deng, Negin Golrezaei, Patrick Jaillet +2
In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc., each of w…
Autobidding Auctions in the Presence of User Costs
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni +2
We study autobidding ad auctions with user costs, where each bidder is value-maximizing subject to a return-over-investment (ROI) constraint, and the seller aims to maximize the so…
Individual Welfare Guarantees in the Autobidding World with Machine-learned Advice
Yuan Deng, Negin Golrezaei, Patrick Jaillet +2
Online advertising channels have commonly focused on maximizing total advertiser value (or welfare) to enhance long-run retention and channel healthiness. Previous literature has s…
Efficiency of the First-Price Auction in the Autobidding World
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni +2
We study the price of anarchy of the first-price auction in the autobidding world, where bidders can be either utility maximizers (i.e., traditional bidders) or value maximizers (i…
Approximately Efficient Bilateral Trade
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Balasubramanian Sivan +1
We study bilateral trade between two strategic agents. The celebrated result of Myerson and Satterthwaite states that in general, no incentive-compatible, individually rational and…
Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World
Santiago Balseiro, Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao +2
In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of re…
Optimal Pricing Schemes for an Impatient Buyer
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Balasubramanian Sivan +1
A patient seller aims to sell a good to an impatient buyer (i.e., one who discounts utility over time). The buyer will remain in the market for a period of time , and her privat…
Towards Efficient Auctions in an Auto-bidding World
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni +1
Auto-bidding has become one of the main options for bidding in online advertisements, in which advertisers only need to specify high-level objectives and leave the complex task of…
New Complexity Results on Coalitional Manipulation of Borda
Yiheng Shen, Pingzhong Tang, Yuan Deng
The Borda voting rule is a positional scoring rule for candidates such that in each vote, the first candidate receives points, the second points and so on. The winn…
Strategizing against No-regret Learners
Yuan Deng, Jon Schneider, Balusubramanian Sivan
How should a player who repeatedly plays a game against a no-regret learner strategize to maximize his utility? We study this question and show that under some mild assumptions, th…
Coalitional Permutation Manipulations in the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
Weiran Shen, Yuan Deng, Pingzhong Tang
In this paper, we consider permutation manipulations by any subset of women in the men-proposing version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. This paper is motivated by the college admis…