693 citations · 739 across the 24 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Evaluating Agents using Social Choice Theory
Marc Lanctot, Kate Larson, Yoram Bachrach +6
We argue that many general evaluation problems can be viewed through the lens of voting theory. Each task is interpreted as a separate voter, which requires only ordinal rankings o…
Approximating Nash Equilibria in Normal-Form Games via Stochastic Optimization
Ian Gemp, Luke Marris, Georgios Piliouras
We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy s…
Equilibrium-Invariant Embedding, Metric Space, and Fundamental Set of Normal-Form Games
Luke Marris, Ian Gemp, Georgios Piliouras
Equilibrium solution concepts of normal-form games, such as Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria, describe the joint strategy profiles from whic…
Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers
Denizalp Goktas, David C. Parkes, Ian Gemp +5
We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-game…
Combining Tree-Search, Generative Models, and Nash Bargaining Concepts in Game-Theoretic Reinforcement Learning
Zun Li, Marc Lanctot, Kevin R. McKee +7
Opponent modeling methods typically involve two crucial steps: building a belief distribution over opponents' strategies, and exploiting this opponent model by playing a best respo…