activity
20192026
most citedExtracting Training Data from Large Language Models

273 citations · 1.1k across the 56 of their papers we have counts for

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Showing cs.CRShow all

28 papers · 1 filter

cs.CR2026

CryptanalysisBench: Can LLMs do Cryptanalysis?

Lukas Fluri, Avital Shafran, Nicholas Carlini +5

Cryptanalysis - the task of finding attacks against cryptographic schemes - sits at the intersection of mathematical reasoning and cybersecurity, two areas where LLMs have advanced…

cs.CR2026

Large-scale online deanonymization with LLMs

Simon Lermen, Daniel Paleka, Joshua Swanson +3

We show that large language models can be used to perform at-scale deanonymization. With full Internet access, our agent can re-identify Hacker News users and Anthropic Interviewer…

cs.CR2025

SIRAJ: Diverse and Efficient Red-Teaming for LLM Agents via Distilled Structured Reasoning

Kaiwen Zhou, Ahmed Elgohary, A S M Iftekhar +1

The ability of LLM agents to plan and invoke tools exposes them to new safety risks, making a comprehensive red-teaming system crucial for discovering vulnerabilities and ensuring…

cs.CR2025

Detecting Adversarial Fine-tuning with Auditing Agents

Sarah Egler, John Schulman, Nicholas Carlini

Large Language Model (LLM) providers expose fine-tuning APIs that let end users fine-tune their frontier LLMs. Unfortunately, it has been shown that an adversary with fine-tuning a…

cs.CR2025

Evaluating the Robustness of a Production Malware Detection System to Transferable Adversarial Attacks

Milad Nasr, Yanick Fratantonio, Luca Invernizzi +7

As deep learning models become widely deployed as components within larger production systems, their individual shortcomings can create system-level vulnerabilities with real-world…

cs.CR2025

LLMs unlock new paths to monetizing exploits

Nicholas Carlini, Milad Nasr, Edoardo Debenedetti +5

We argue that Large language models (LLMs) will soon alter the economics of cyberattacks. Instead of attacking the most commonly used software and monetizing exploits by targeting…

cs.CR2025★ 1 cited

AutoAdvExBench: Benchmarking autonomous exploitation of adversarial example defenses

Nicholas Carlini, Javier Rando, Edoardo Debenedetti +2

We introduce AutoAdvExBench, a benchmark to evaluate if large language models (LLMs) can autonomously exploit defenses to adversarial examples. Unlike existing security benchmarks…

cs.CR2025★ 6 cited

Defeating Prompt Injections by Design

Edoardo Debenedetti, Ilia Shumailov, Tianqi Fan +7

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an untrusted environment. However, LLM agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attack…

cs.CR2024

On Evaluating the Durability of Safeguards for Open-Weight LLMs

Xiangyu Qi, Boyi Wei, Nicholas Carlini +7

Stakeholders -- from model developers to policymakers -- seek to minimize the dual-use risks of large language models (LLMs). An open challenge to this goal is whether technical sa…

cs.CR2024★ 1 cited

SoK: Watermarking for AI-Generated Content

Xuandong Zhao, Sam Gunn, Miranda Christ +11

As the outputs of generative AI (GenAI) techniques improve in quality, it becomes increasingly challenging to distinguish them from human-created content. Watermarking schemes are…

cs.CR2024★ 3 cited

Stealing User Prompts from Mixture of Experts

Itay Yona, Ilia Shumailov, Jamie Hayes +1

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models improve the efficiency and scalability of dense language models by routing each token to a small number of experts in each layer. In this paper, we…

cs.CR2024★ 1 cited

Remote Timing Attacks on Efficient Language Model Inference

Nicholas Carlini, Milad Nasr

Scaling up language models has significantly increased their capabilities. But larger models are slower models, and so there is now an extensive body of work (e.g., speculative sam…

cs.CR2024★ 1 cited

Persistent Pre-Training Poisoning of LLMs

Yiming Zhang, Javier Rando, Ivan Evtimov +5

Large language models are pre-trained on uncurated text datasets consisting of trillions of tokens scraped from the Web. Prior work has shown that: (1) web-scraped pre-training dat…

cs.CR2024★ 3 cited

Adversarial Perturbations Cannot Reliably Protect Artists From Generative AI

Robert Hönig, Javier Rando, Nicholas Carlini +1

Artists are increasingly concerned about advancements in image generation models that can closely replicate their unique artistic styles. In response, several protection tools agai…

cs.CR2024★ 7 cited

Stealing Part of a Production Language Model

Nicholas Carlini, Daniel Paleka, Krishnamurthy Dj Dvijotham +11

We introduce the first model-stealing attack that extracts precise, nontrivial information from black-box production language models like OpenAI's ChatGPT or Google's PaLM-2. Speci…

cs.CR2023★ 6 cited

Privacy Side Channels in Machine Learning Systems

Edoardo Debenedetti, Giorgio Severi, Nicholas Carlini +5

Most current approaches for protecting privacy in machine learning (ML) assume that models exist in a vacuum. Yet, in reality, these models are part of larger systems that include…

cs.CR2023★ 10 cited

Backdoor Attacks for In-Context Learning with Language Models

Nikhil Kandpal, Matthew Jagielski, Florian Tramèr +1

Because state-of-the-art language models are expensive to train, most practitioners must make use of one of the few publicly available language models or language model APIs. This…

cs.CR2023

Evading Black-box Classifiers Without Breaking Eggs

Edoardo Debenedetti, Nicholas Carlini, Florian Tramèr

Decision-based evasion attacks repeatedly query a black-box classifier to generate adversarial examples. Prior work measures the cost of such attacks by the total number of queries…

cs.CR2023★ 6 cited

Students Parrot Their Teachers: Membership Inference on Model Distillation

Matthew Jagielski, Milad Nasr, Christopher Choquette-Choo +2

Model distillation is frequently proposed as a technique to reduce the privacy leakage of machine learning. These empirical privacy defenses rely on the intuition that distilled ``…

cs.CR2023★ 15 cited

Poisoning Web-Scale Training Datasets is Practical

Nicholas Carlini, Matthew Jagielski, Christopher A. Choquette-Choo +6

Deep learning models are often trained on distributed, web-scale datasets crawled from the internet. In this paper, we introduce two new dataset poisoning attacks that intentionall…

cs.CR2023★ 100 cited

Extracting Training Data from Diffusion Models

Nicholas Carlini, Jamie Hayes, Milad Nasr +6

Image diffusion models such as DALL-E 2, Imagen, and Stable Diffusion have attracted significant attention due to their ability to generate high-quality synthetic images. In this w…

cs.CR2022★ 4 cited

Preprocessors Matter! Realistic Decision-Based Attacks on Machine Learning Systems

Chawin Sitawarin, Florian Tramèr, Nicholas Carlini

Decision-based attacks construct adversarial examples against a machine learning (ML) model by making only hard-label queries. These attacks have mainly been applied directly to st…

cs.CR2022

Truth Serum: Poisoning Machine Learning Models to Reveal Their Secrets

Florian Tramèr, Reza Shokri, Ayrton San Joaquin +4

We introduce a new class of attacks on machine learning models. We show that an adversary who can poison a training dataset can cause models trained on this dataset to leak signifi…

cs.CR2021★ 30 cited

Membership Inference Attacks From First Principles

Nicholas Carlini, Steve Chien, Milad Nasr +3

A membership inference attack allows an adversary to query a trained machine learning model to predict whether or not a particular example was contained in the model's training dat…