69 citations · 100 across the 20 of their papers we have counts for
23 papers
Information Structure of Defection Decisions in a Colonel Blotto Model of Deterrence
Tristan Mott, David Grimsman, Keith Paarporn
In strategic interactions, deterrence is an outcome where one party incentivizes the other party to not participate. This concept can be applied to Colonel Blotto games between two…
Adverse Effects of V2V Adoption on Road Safety
Zhenqi Liu, Philip N. Brown, Keith Paarporn
Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication is expected to improve road safety and reduce congestion. However, prior work shows that V2V information sharing under partial adoption may i…
Incentive Design in Competitive Resource Allocation: Exploiting Valuation Asymmetry in Tullock Contests
Gilberto Diaz-Garcia, Keith Paarporn, Jason R. Marden
In competitive resource allocation, a central coordinator may seek to gain an advantage not by directly controlling subordinate agents, but by strategically manipulating the inform…
Beyond Arbitrary Allocations: Security Values in Constrained General Lotto Games
Keith Paarporn, Jason R. Marden
Resource allocation problems across multiple contests are ubiquitous in adversarial settings, from military operations to market competition. While Colonel Blotto and General Lotto…
Move Over, Prisoner's Dilemma: Colonel Blotto has arrived
Keith Paarporn, Jason R. Marden
The Prisoner's Dilemma, zero-sum games, LQR team problems, and differential games have shaped game theory in controls for decades, but the field's most pressing adversarial challen…
Allocation of Heterogeneous Resources in General Lotto Games
Keith Paarporn, Adel Aghajan, Jason R. Marden
The allocation of resources plays an important role in the completion of system objectives and tasks, especially in the presence of strategic adversaries. Optimal allocation strate…
The Value of Compromising Strategic Intent in General Lotto Games
Gilberto Diaz-Garcia, Keith Paarporn, Jason R. Marden
Resource allocation in adversarial environments is a fundamental challenge across various domains, from corporate competition to military strategy. This article examines the impact…
Inefficient Alliance Formation in Coalitional Blotto Games
Vade Shah, Keith Paarporn, Jason R. Marden
When multiple agents are engaged in a network of conflict, some can advance their competitive positions by forming alliances with each other. However, the costs associated with est…
Conditions for Altruistic Perversity in Two-Strategy Population Games
Colton Hill, Philip N. Brown, Keith Paarporn
Self-interested behavior from individuals can collectively lead to poor societal outcomes. These outcomes can seemingly be improved through the actions of altruistic agents, which…
Reinforcement Strategies in General Lotto Games
Keith Paarporn, Rahul Chandan, Mahnoosh Alizadeh +1
Strategic decisions are often made over multiple periods of time, wherein decisions made earlier impact a competitor's success in later stages. In this paper, we study these dynami…
The Defense of Networked Targets in General Lotto games
Adel Aghajan, Keith Paarporn, Jason R. Marden
Ensuring the security of networked systems is a significant problem, considering the susceptibility of modern infrastructures and technologies to adversarial interference. A centra…
Strategically revealing capabilities in General Lotto games
Keith Paarporn, Philip N. Brown
Can revealing one's competitive capabilities to an opponent offer strategic benefits? In this paper, we address this question in the context of General Lotto games, a class of two-…
Strategic investments in multi-stage General Lotto games
Rahul Chandan, Keith Paarporn, Mahnoosh Alizadeh +1
In adversarial interactions, one is often required to make strategic decisions over multiple periods of time, wherein decisions made earlier impact a player's competitive standing…
Strategically revealing intentions in General Lotto games
Keith Paarporn, Rahul Chandan, Dan Kovenock +2
Strategic decision-making in uncertain and adversarial environments is crucial for the security of modern systems and infrastructures. A salient feature of many optimal decision-ma…
A General Lotto game with asymmetric budget uncertainty
Keith Paarporn, Rahul Chandan, Mahnoosh Alizadeh +1
The General Lotto game is a popular variant of the famous Colonel Blotto game, in which two opposing players allocate limited resources over many battlefields. In this paper, we co…
The Division of Assets in Multiagent Systems: A Case Study in Team Blotto Games
Keith Paarporn, Rahul Chandan, Mahnoosh Alizadeh +1
Multi-agent systems are designed to concurrently accomplish a diverse set of tasks at unprecedented scale. Here, the central problems faced by a system operator are to decide (i) h…
When showing your hand pays off: Announcing strategic intentions in Colonel Blotto games
Rahul Chandan, Keith Paarporn, Jason R. Marden
In competitive adversarial environments, it is often advantageous to obfuscate one's strategies or capabilities. However, revealing one's strategic intentions may shift the dynamic…
Characterizing the interplay between information and strength in Blotto games
Keith Paarporn, Rahul Chandan, Mahnoosh Alizadeh +1
In this paper, we investigate informational asymmetries in the Colonel Blotto game, a game-theoretic model of competitive resource allocation between two players over a set of batt…
The Impact of Complex and Informed Adversarial Behavior in Graphical Coordination Games
Keith Paarporn, Brian Canty, Philip N. Brown +2
How does system-level information impact the ability of an adversary to degrade performance in a networked control system? How does the complexity of an adversary's strategy affect…
A risk-security tradeoff in graphical coordination games
Keith Paarporn, Mahnoosh Alizadeh, Jason R. Marden
A system relying on the collective behavior of decision-makers can be vulnerable to a variety of adversarial attacks. How well can a system operator protect performance in the face…
Control of learning in anti-coordination network games
Ceyhun Eksin, Keith Paarporn
We consider control of heterogeneous players repeatedly playing an anti-coordination network game. In an anti-coordination game, each player has an incentive to differentiate its a…
Going Viral: Stability of Consensus-Driven Adoptive Spread
Sebastian F. Ruf, Keith Paarporn, Philip E. Paré
The spread of new products in a networked population is often modeled as an epidemic. However, in the case of `complex' contagion, these models {do not capture nuanced, dynamic soc…
Networked SIS Epidemics with Awareness
Keith Paarporn, Ceyhun Eksin, Joshua S. Weitz +1
We study an SIS epidemic process over a static contact network where the nodes have partial information about the epidemic state. They react by limiting their interactions with the…