10 citations · 10 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers
SIS Epidemic Containment under Game-theoretic Rational Learning
Urmee Maitra, Keith Paarporn, Ceyhun Eksin
We consider a susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) epidemiological model in which individuals dynamically decide whether to follow social distancing or not. Driven by game-theore…
Analysis of a Competitive Bivirus SIS Epidemic Model with Game Theoretic Social Distancing
Benjamin Catalano, Keith Paarporn, Sebin Gracy
We propose a competitive bi-virus model with dynamic social distancing behavior. Our model illustrates how public perception of different viruses changes the conditions for their e…
The Tragedy of the Commons in Multi-Population Resource Games
Yamin Vahmian, Keith Paarporn
Self-optimizing behaviors can lead to outcomes where collective benefits are ultimately destroyed, a well-known phenomenon known as the ``tragedy of the commons". These scenarios a…
Game-theoretic Social Distancing in Competitive Bi-Virus SIS Epidemics
Benjamin Catalano, Keith Paarporn, Sebin Gracy
Numerous elements drive the spread of infectious diseases in complex real-world networks. Of particular interest is social behaviors that evolve in tandem with the spread of diseas…
An Analysis of Logit Learning with the r-Lambert Function
Rory Gavin, Ming Cao, Keith Paarporn
The well-known replicator equation in evolutionary game theory describes how population-level behaviors change over time when individuals make decisions using simple imitation lear…
Two competing populations with a common environmental resource
Keith Paarporn, James Nelson
Feedback-evolving games is a framework that models the co-evolution between payoff functions and an environmental state. It serves as a useful tool to analyze many social dilemmas…
The madness of people: rational learning in feedback-evolving games
Keith Paarporn
The replicator equation in evolutionary game theory describes the change in a population's behaviors over time given suitable incentives. It arises when individuals make decisions…
Optimal control policies for evolutionary dynamics with environmental feedback
Keith Paarporn, Ceyhun Eksin, Joshua S. Weitz +1
We study a dynamical model of a population of cooperators and defectors whose actions have long-term consequences on environmental "commons" - what we term the "resource". Cooperat…