activity
20202026
most citedToward Trustworthy AI Development: Mechanisms for Supporting Verifiable Claims

219 citations · 658 across the 34 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

35 papers

cs.CY2026

Embedded Assessments for Frontier AI

Jacob Charnock, Sophie Williams, Zaheed Kara +5

Third-party evaluations for frontier AI have mostly tested models through external interfaces before deployment. But the risks from frontier AI models depend on how their developer…

cs.CY2026

Underwriting the Agent Economy: The Blueprint for an AI Insurance Stack

Cristian Trout, Sanmi Koyejo, Sasha Romanosky +34

From maritime trade to commercial nuclear power, insurance has been the enabler of major economic and technological developments by pricing risk, limiting downside, and spreading b…

cs.CY2026★ 3 cited

Measuring AI R&D Automation

Alan Chan, Ranay Padarath, Joe Kwon +2

The automation of AI R&D (AIRDA) could have significant implications, but its extent and ultimate effects remain uncertain. We need empirical data to resolve these uncertainties, b…

cs.CY2026★ 1 cited

Frontier AI Auditing: Toward Rigorous Third-Party Assessment of Safety and Security Practices at Leading AI Companies

Miles Brundage, Noemi Dreksler, Aidan Homewood +45

We outline a vision for frontier AI auditing, which we define as rigorous third-party verification of frontier AI developers' safety and security claims, and evaluation of their sy…

cs.CY2025

The Future of the AI Summit Series

Lucia Velasco, Charles Martinet, Henry de Zoete +27

This policy memo examines the evolution of the international AI Summit series, initiated at Bletchley Park in 2023 and continued through Seoul in 2024 and Paris in 2025, as a forum…

cs.CY2025

From Turing to Tomorrow: The UK's Approach to AI Regulation

Oliver Ritchie, Markus Anderljung, Tom Rachman

The UK has pursued a distinctive path in AI regulation: less cautious than the EU but more willing to address risks than the US, and has emerged as a global leader in coordinating…

cs.AI2025

In-House Evaluation Is Not Enough: Towards Robust Third-Party Flaw Disclosure for General-Purpose AI

Shayne Longpre, Kevin Klyman, Ruth E. Appel +31

The widespread deployment of general-purpose AI (GPAI) systems introduces significant new risks. Yet the infrastructure, practices, and norms for reporting flaws in GPAI systems re…

cs.CY2025★ 3 cited

On Regulating Downstream AI Developers

Sophie Williams, Jonas Schuett, Markus Anderljung

Foundation models - models trained on broad data that can be adapted to a wide range of downstream tasks - can pose significant risks, ranging from intimate image abuse, cyberattac…

cs.AI2025★ 2 cited

Infrastructure for AI Agents

Alan Chan, Kevin Wei, Sihao Huang +5

AI agents plan and execute interactions in open-ended environments. For example, OpenAI's Operator can use a web browser to do product comparisons and buy online goods. Much resear…

cs.CY2024★ 3 cited

Safety cases for frontier AI

Marie Davidsen Buhl, Gaurav Sett, Leonie Koessler +2

As frontier artificial intelligence (AI) systems become more capable, it becomes more important that developers can explain why their systems are sufficiently safe. One way to do s…

cs.CY2024★ 1 cited

A Grading Rubric for AI Safety Frameworks

Jide Alaga, Jonas Schuett, Markus Anderljung

Over the past year, artificial intelligence (AI) companies have been increasingly adopting AI safety frameworks. These frameworks outline how companies intend to keep the potential…

cs.CY2024★ 7 cited

Open Problems in Technical AI Governance

Anka Reuel, Ben Bucknall, Stephen Casper +30

AI progress is creating a growing range of risks and opportunities, but it is often unclear how they should be navigated. In many cases, the barriers and uncertainties faced are at…

cs.CY2024★ 2 cited

From Principles to Rules: A Regulatory Approach for Frontier AI

Jonas Schuett, Markus Anderljung, Alexis Carlier +2

Several jurisdictions are starting to regulate frontier artificial intelligence (AI) systems, i.e. general-purpose AI systems that match or exceed the capabilities present in the m…

cs.CY2024★ 4 cited

Risk thresholds for frontier AI

Leonie Koessler, Jonas Schuett, Markus Anderljung

Frontier artificial intelligence (AI) systems could pose increasing risks to public safety and security. But what level of risk is acceptable? One increasingly popular approach is…

cs.AI2024

IDs for AI Systems

Alan Chan, Noam Kolt, Peter Wills +7

AI systems are increasingly pervasive, yet information needed to decide whether and how to engage with them may not exist or be accessible. A user may not be able to verify whether…

cs.CY2024★ 2 cited

Towards interactive evaluations for interaction harms in human-AI systems

Lujain Ibrahim, Saffron Huang, Umang Bhatt +2

Current AI evaluation methods, which rely on static, model-only tests, fail to account for harms that emerge through sustained human-AI interaction. As AI systems proliferate and a…

cs.CY2024★ 3 cited

Societal Adaptation to Advanced AI

Jamie Bernardi, Gabriel Mukobi, Hilary Greaves +2

Existing strategies for managing risks from advanced AI systems often focus on affecting what AI systems are developed and how they diffuse. However, this approach becomes less fea…

cs.CY2024

Responsible Reporting for Frontier AI Development

Noam Kolt, Markus Anderljung, Joslyn Barnhart +7

Mitigating the risks from frontier AI systems requires up-to-date and reliable information about those systems. Organizations that develop and deploy frontier systems have signific…

cs.LG2024★ 16 cited

Foundational Challenges in Assuring Alignment and Safety of Large Language Models

Usman Anwar, Abulhair Saparov, Javier Rando +39

This work identifies 18 foundational challenges in assuring the alignment and safety of large language models (LLMs). These challenges are organized into three different categories…

cs.CY2024★ 22 cited

Computing Power and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence

Girish Sastry, Lennart Heim, Haydn Belfield +16

Computing power, or "compute," is crucial for the development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities. As a result, governments and companies have started to le…

cs.CY2024★ 1 cited

Visibility into AI Agents

Alan Chan, Carson Ezell, Max Kaufmann +9

Increased delegation of commercial, scientific, governmental, and personal activities to AI agents -- systems capable of pursuing complex goals with limited supervision -- may exac…

cs.CY2023★ 6 cited

Towards Publicly Accountable Frontier LLMs: Building an External Scrutiny Ecosystem under the ASPIRE Framework

Markus Anderljung, Everett Thornton Smith, Joe O'Brien +7

With the increasing integration of frontier large language models (LLMs) into society and the economy, decisions related to their training, deployment, and use have far-reaching im…

cs.CY2023★ 5 cited

Open-Sourcing Highly Capable Foundation Models: An evaluation of risks, benefits, and alternative methods for pursuing open-source objectives

Elizabeth Seger, Noemi Dreksler, Richard Moulange +19

Recent decisions by leading AI labs to either open-source their models or to restrict access to their models has sparked debate about whether, and how, increasingly capable AI mode…

cs.CY2023★ 76 cited

Frontier AI Regulation: Managing Emerging Risks to Public Safety

Markus Anderljung, Joslyn Barnhart, Anton Korinek +21

Advanced AI models hold the promise of tremendous benefits for humanity, but society needs to proactively manage the accompanying risks. In this paper, we focus on what we term "fr…