4 citations · 8 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Efficiently Solving Turn-Taking Stochastic Games with Extensive-Form Correlation
Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer
We study equilibrium computation with extensive-form correlation in two-player turn-taking stochastic games. Our main results are two-fold: (1) We give an algorithm for computing a…
Nonbossy Mechanisms: Mechanism Design Robust to Secondary Goals
Renato Paes Leme, Jon Schneider, Hanrui Zhang
We study mechanism design when agents may have hidden secondary goals which will play a role when the primary utility of the outcomes is the same. We show that in such cases, a mec…
Autobidding Auctions in the Presence of User Costs
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni +2
We study autobidding ad auctions with user costs, where each bidder is value-maximizing subject to a return-over-investment (ROI) constraint, and the seller aims to maximize the so…
Efficiency of the First-Price Auction in the Autobidding World
Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Vahab Mirrokni +2
We study the price of anarchy of the first-price auction in the autobidding world, where bidders can be either utility maximizers (i.e., traditional bidders) or value maximizers (i…
Efficient Algorithms for Planning with Participation Constraints
Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer
We consider the problem of planning with participation constraints introduced in [Zhang et al., 2022]. In this problem, a principal chooses actions in a Markov decision process, re…
Automated Mechanism Design for Classification with Partial Verification
Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng, Vincent Conitzer
We study the problem of automated mechanism design with partial verification, where each type can (mis)report only a restricted set of types (rather than any other type), induced b…