activity
20182026
most citedAutomated Dynamic Mechanism Design

4 citations · 6 across the 12 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

12 papers

econ.TH2026

The Limits of Price Discrimination with a Bayesian Seller

Yuan Deng, Yilin Li, Wei Tang +1

We study the limits of third-degree price discrimination when the production cost is Bayesian and private to the seller, generalizing the seminal work of Bergemann, Brooks and Morr…

cs.GT2026

Algorithmic Expert Aggregation

Wei Tang, Hanrui Zhang

Forecast aggregation aims to combine information from multiple Bayesian experts' forecasts into an aggregate forecast. In much of this literature, however, the aggregate forecast i…

cs.GT2024

Aggregating Quantitative Relative Judgments: From Social Choice to Ranking Prediction

Yixuan Even Xu, Hanrui Zhang, Yu Cheng +1

Quantitative Relative Judgment Aggregation (QRJA) is a new research topic in (computational) social choice. In the QRJA model, agents provide judgments on the relative quality of d…

cs.LG2024

Strategic Littlestone Dimension: Improved Bounds on Online Strategic Classification

Saba Ahmadi, Kunhe Yang, Hanrui Zhang

We study the problem of online binary classification in settings where strategic agents can modify their observable features to receive a positive classification. We model the set…

cs.GT2024

Computational Aspects of Bayesian Persuasion under Approximate Best Response

Kunhe Yang, Hanrui Zhang

We study Bayesian persuasion under approximate best response, where the receiver may choose any action that is not too much suboptimal given their posterior belief upon receiving t…

cs.GT2023

Non-Excludable Bilateral Trade Between Groups

Yixuan Even Xu, Hanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer

Bilateral trade is one of the most natural and important forms of economic interaction: A seller has a single, indivisible item for sale, and a buyer is potentially interested. The…

cs.GT2023★ 1 cited

Efficiency of the Generalized Second-Price Auction for Value Maximizers

Yuan Deng, Mohammad Mahdian, Jieming Mao +3

We study the price of anarchy of the generalized second-price auction where bidders are value maximizers (i.e., autobidders). We show that in general the price of anarchy can be as…

cs.AI2021

Near-Optimal Reviewer Splitting in Two-Phase Paper Reviewing and Conference Experiment Design

Steven Jecmen, Hanrui Zhang, Ryan Liu +3

Many scientific conferences employ a two-phase paper review process, where some papers are assigned additional reviewers after the initial reviews are submitted. Many conferences a…

cs.GT2021★ 4 cited

Automated Dynamic Mechanism Design

Hanrui Zhang, Vincent Conitzer

We study Bayesian automated mechanism design in unstructured dynamic environments, where a principal repeatedly interacts with an agent, and takes actions based on the strategic ag…

cs.SI2020★ 1 cited

On the Equivalence Between High-Order Network-Influence Frameworks: General-Threshold, Hypergraph-Triggering, and Logic-Triggering Models

Wei Chen, Shang-Hua Teng, Hanrui Zhang

In this paper, we study several high-order network-influence-propagation frameworks and their connection to the classical network diffusion frameworks such as the triggering model…

cs.AI2020

Planning with Submodular Objective Functions

Ruosong Wang, Hanrui Zhang, Devendra Singh Chaplot +2

We study planning with submodular objective functions, where instead of maximizing the cumulative reward, the goal is to maximize the objective value induced by a submodular functi…

cs.SI2018

A Systematic Framework and Characterization of Influence-Based Network Centrality

Wei Chen, Shang-Hua Teng, Hanrui Zhang

In this paper, we present a framework for studying the following fundamental question in network analysis: How should one assess the centralities of nodes in an information/influen…