8 citations · 18 across the 23 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Mechanism Design with Delegated Bidding
Gagan Aggarwal, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas +1
We consider the problem of a designer who wants to allocate resources to representatives, that then distribute the resources they receive among the individuals they represent. Moti…
V3rified: Revelation vs Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Decentralized Verifiable Computation
Tiantian Gong, Aniket Kate, Alexandros Psomas +1
In the era of Web3, decentralized technologies have emerged as the cornerstone of a new digital paradigm. Backed by a decentralized blockchain architecture, the Web3 space aims to…
Mechanism Design via the Interim Relaxation
Kshipra Bhawalkar, Marios Mertzanidis, Divyarthi Mohan +1
We study revenue maximization for agents with additive preferences, subject to downward-closed constraints on the set of feasible allocations. In seminal work, Alaei~\cite{alaei201…
Automating Food Drop: The Power of Two Choices for Dynamic and Fair Food Allocation
Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma
Food waste and food insecurity are two closely related pressing global issues. Food rescue organizations worldwide run programs aimed at addressing the two problems. In this paper,…
On the Fairness of Normalized p-Means for Allocating Goods and Chores
Owen Eckart, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma
Allocating items in a fair and economically efficient manner is a central problem in fair division. We study this problem for agents with additive preferences, when items are all g…