8 citations · 18 across the 23 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Refined Mechanism Design for Approximately Structured Priors via Active Regression
Christos Boutsikas, Petros Drineas, Marios Mertzanidis +2
We consider the problem of a revenue-maximizing seller with a large number of items for sale to strategic bidders, whose valuations are drawn independently from high-dimens…
On the Robustness of Mechanism Design under Total Variation Distance
Anuran Makur, Marios Mertzanidis, Alexandros Psomas +1
We study the problem of designing mechanisms when agents' valuation functions are drawn from unknown and correlated prior distributions. In particular, we are given a prior distrib…
Fairly Allocating Goods in Parallel
Rohan Garg, Alexandros Psomas
We initiate the study of parallel algorithms for fairly allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive preferences. We give fast parallel algorithms for various fundamenta…
On the Existence of Envy-Free Allocations Beyond Additive Valuations
Gerdus Benadè, Daniel Halpern, Alexandros Psomas +1
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items among agents. Envy-free allocations, in which each agent prefers her bundle to the bundle of every other agent,…
Reward Selection with Noisy Observations
Kamyar Azizzadenesheli, Trung Dang, Aranyak Mehta +2
We study a fundamental problem in optimization under uncertainty. There are boxes; each box contains a hidden reward . Rewards are drawn i.i.d. from an unknown distrib…
Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division
Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan +1
We study fair resource allocation with strategic agents. It is well-known that, across multiple fundamental problems in this domain, truthfulness and fairness are incompatible. For…