4 papers
Fair Division with Binary Valuations: One Rule to Rule Them All
Daniel Halpern, Ariel D. Procaccia, Alexandros Psomas +1
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents. Prior research focuses on additive agent preferences, which leads to an impossibility when seeking truthfulness, fairnes…
Persuasion and Incentives Through the Lens of Duality
Shaddin Dughmi, Rad Niazadeh, Alexandros Psomas +1
Lagrangian duality underlies both classical and modern mechanism design. In particular, the dual perspective often permits simple and detail-free characterizations of optimal and a…
How to Hire Secretaries with Stochastic Departures
Thomas Kesselheim, Alexandros Psomas, Shai Vardi
We study a generalization of the secretary problem, where decisions do not have to be made immediately upon candidates' arrivals. After arriving, each candidate stays in the system…
Fairness-Efficiency Tradeoffs in Dynamic Fair Division
David Zeng, Alexandros Psomas
We investigate the tradeoffs between fairness and efficiency when allocating indivisible items over time. Suppose T items arrive over time and must be allocated upon arrival, immed…