Inter-role reciprocity in evolutionary trust game on square lattices

Abstract

Simulating bipartite games, such as the trust game, is not straightforward due to the lack of a natural way to distinguish roles in a single population. The square lattice topology can provide a simple yet elegant solution by alternating trustors and trustees. For even lattice sizes, it creates two disjoint diagonal sub-lattices for strategy learning, while game interactions can take place on the original lattice. This setup ensures a minimal spatial structure that allows interactions across roles and learning within roles. By simulations on this setup, we detect an inter-role spatial reciprocity mechanism, through which trust can emerge. In particular, a moderate return ratio allows investing trustors and trustworthy trustees to form inter-role clusters and thus save trust. If the return is too high, it harms the survival of trustees; if too low, it harms trustors. The proposed simulation framework is also applicable to any bipartite game to uncover potential inter-role spatial mechanisms across various scenarios.

10 pages, 7 figures

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