Moderate immigration may promote a peak of cooperation among natives
arXiv:2011.15105 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevE.104.014304
Abstract
In a world of hardening borders, nations may deprive themselves of enjoying the benefits of cooperative immigrants. Here, we analyze the effect of efficient cooperative immigrants on a population playing public goods games. We considered a population structured on a square lattice with individuals playing public goods games with their neighbors. The demographics are determined by stochastic birth, death, and migration. The strategies spread through imitation dynamics. Our model shows that cooperation among natives can emerge due to social contagion of good role-model agents that can provide better quality public goods. Only a small fraction of efficient cooperators, among immigrants, is enough to trigger cooperation across the native population. We see that native cooperation achieves its peak at moderate values of immigration rate. Such efficient immigrant cooperators act as nucleation centers for the growth of cooperative clusters, that eventually dominate defection.
References in corpus (9)
- Evolutionary games on graphs
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- Evolutionary dynamics of group interactions on structured populations: A review
- Reward and cooperation in the spatial public goods game
- Dynamical Organization of Cooperation in Complex Topologies
- Sociophysics: A review of Galam models
- Does mobility decrease cooperation?
- If players are sparse social dilemmas are too: Importance of percolation for evolution of cooperation
- Risk-driven migration and the collective-risk social dilemma
Cited by in corpus (5)
- Tactical cooperation of defectors in a multi-stage public goods game
- When costly migration helps to improve cooperation
- Evolution of cooperation in multi-agent systems with time-varying tags, multiple strategies, and heterogeneous invasion dynamics
- Anomalous behavior of Replicator dynamics for the Prisoner's Dilemma on diluted lattices
- Acculturation and the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games