Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences
arXiv:2007.01795 · doi:10.1007/978-3-031-09016-5
Abstract
Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set of representative candidates based on voters' preferences. It occurs in applications ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to the design of modern computer applications (collaborative filtering, dynamic Q&A platforms, diversifying search results). All these applications share the problem of identifying a representative subset of alternatives -- and the study of multi-winner voting is the principled analysis of this task. This book provides a thorough and in-depth look at multi-winner voting based on approval preferences. One speaks of approval preferences if voters express their preferences by providing a set of candidates they approve. Approval preferences thus separate candidates in approved and disapproved ones, a simple, binary classification. The corresponding multi-winner voting rules are called approval-based committee (ABC) rules. Due to the simplicity of approval preferences, ABC rules are widely suitable for practical use. Recent years have seen a rising interest in ABC voting. While multi-winner voting has been originally a topic studied by economists and political scientists, a significant share of recent progress has occurred in the field of computational social choice. This discipline is situated in the intersection of artificial intelligence, computer science, economics, and (to a lesser degree) political science, combining insights and methods from these distinct fields. The goal of this book is to present fundamental concepts and results for ABC voting and to discuss the recent advances in computational social choice. The main focus is on axiomatic analysis, algorithmic results, and relevant applications.
This is a draft of the upcoming book "Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences" published by Springer
References in corpus (14)
- Penrose voting system and optimal quota
- Group Fairness in Committee Selection
- Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product Rule
- A verifiably secure and proportional committee election rule
- Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Additive Utilities
- Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting: Axioms and Algorithms
- Fair mixing: the case of dichotomous preferences
- Overview of Polkadot and its Design Considerations
- Computing the Schulze Method for Large-Scale Preference Data Sets
- Individual Representation in Approval-Based Committee Voting
- Using Multiwinner Voting to Search for Movies
- Proportionality in Committee Selection with Negative Feelings
- Phragmén's Voting Methods and Justified Representation
- Multi-winner Approval Voting Goes Epistemic
Cited by in corpus (10)
- Optimized Distortion and Proportional Fairness in Voting
- Truthful Cake Sharing
- Approval-Based Voting with Mixed Goods
- The Price of Justified Representation
- The Leximin Approach for a Sequence of Collective Decisions
- Weighted Envy-Freeness for Submodular Valuations
- Optimizing Prognostic Biomarker Discovery in Pancreatic Cancer Through Hybrid Ensemble Feature Selection and Multi-Omics Data
- A Generalised Theory of Proportionality in Collective Decision Making
- Drawing a Map of Elections
- AI of the People, by the People, for the People: A Social Choice Approach to Collective Control of Artificial Intelligence