Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting: Axioms and Algorithms

Abstract

Participatory budgeting is one of the exciting developments in deliberative grassroots democracy. We concentrate on approval elections and propose proportional representation axioms in participatory budgeting, by generalizing relevant axioms for approval-based multi-winner elections. We observe a rich landscape with respect to the computational complexity of identifying proportional budgets and computing such, and present budgeting methods that satisfy these axioms by identifying budgets that are representative to the demands of vast segments of the voters.

References in corpus (4)

• Phragmén's and Thiele's election methods
• The Condorcet Principle for Multiwinner Elections: From Shortlisting to Proportionality
• The Core of the Participatory Budgeting Problem
• A Participatory Democratic Budgeting Algorithm

Cited by in corpus (6)

• Multi-Winner Voting with Approval Preferences
• Aggregation over Metric Spaces: Proposing and Voting in Elections, Budgeting, and Legislation
• A Framework for Approval-based Budgeting Methods
• A Participatory Democratic Budgeting Algorithm
• Price of Fairness in Budget Division for Egalitarian Social Welfare
• Proportional Participatory Budgeting with Projects Interaction