Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers
arXiv:2004.02350 · doi:10.1007/s11127-023-01042-3
Abstract
We propose a Condorcet consistent voting method that we call Split Cycle. Split Cycle belongs to the small family of known voting methods satisfying the anti-vote-splitting criterion of independence of clones. In this family, only Split Cycle satisfies a new criterion we call immunity to spoilers, which concerns adding candidates to elections, as well as the known criteria of positive involvement and negative involvement, which concern adding voters to elections. Thus, in contrast to other clone-independent methods, Split Cycle mitigates both "spoiler effects" and "strong no show paradoxes."
arXiv commentFinal version with tables and graphs updated with additional data
References in corpus (6)
- On the Structure of Stable Tournament Solutions
- Robust Bounds on Choosing from Large Tournaments
- Measuring Violations of Positive Involvement in Voting
- The Schulze Method of Voting
- Minimax is the best electoral system after all
- Impossibility theorems involving weakenings of expansion consistency and resoluteness in voting