43 citations · 78 across the 13 of their papers we have counts for
14 papers
Learning to Manipulate under Limited Information
Wesley H. Holliday, Alexander Kristoffersen, Eric Pacuit
By classic results in social choice theory, any reasonable preferential voting method sometimes gives individuals an incentive to report an insincere preference. The extent to whic…
An extension of May's Theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting
Wesley H. Holliday, Eric Pacuit
May's Theorem [K. O. May, Econometrica 20 (1952) 680-684] characterizes majority voting on two alternatives as the unique preferential voting method satisfying several simple axiom…
An Axiomatic Characterization of Split Cycle
Yifeng Ding, Wesley H. Holliday, Eric Pacuit
A number of rules for resolving majority cycles in elections have been proposed in the literature. Recently, Holliday and Pacuit (Journal of Theoretical Politics 33 (2021) 475-524)…
Impossibility theorems involving weakenings of expansion consistency and resoluteness in voting
Wesley H. Holliday, Chase Norman, Eric Pacuit +1
A fundamental principle of individual rational choice is Sen's axiom, also known as expansion consistency, stating that any alternative chosen from each of two menus must be ch…
Voting Theory in the Lean Theorem Prover
Wesley H. Holliday, Chase Norman, Eric Pacuit
There is a long tradition of fruitful interaction between logic and social choice theory. In recent years, much of this interaction has focused on computer-aided methods such as SA…
Stable Voting
Wesley H. Holliday, Eric Pacuit
We propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candi…