The Schulze Method of Voting
arXiv:1804.02973
Abstract
We propose a new single-winner election method ("Schulze method") and prove that it satisfies many academic criteria (e.g. monotonicity, reversal symmetry, resolvability, independence of clones, Condorcet criterion, k-consistency, polynomial runtime). We then generalize this method to proportional representation by the single transferable vote ("Schulze STV") and to methods to calculate a proportional ranking ("Schulze proportional ranking"). Furthermore, we propose a generalization of the Condorcet criterion to multi-winner elections. This paper contains a large number of examples to illustrate the proposed methods.
References in corpus (7)
- Influence in Weighted Committees
- Fault-Tolerant Entity Resolution with the Crowd
- Measuring Majority Power and Veto Power of Voting Rules
- A continuous rating method for preferential voting
- Minimax is the best electoral system after all
- Are Condorcet and minimax voting systems the best?
- A Note on the Complexity of Manipulating Weighted Schulze Voting