Strong light illumination on gain-switched semiconductor lasers helps the eavesdropper in practical quantum key distribution systems
arXiv:1803.05616 · doi:10.1016/j.optcom.2018.03.029
Abstract
The temperature of the semiconductor diode increases under strong light illumination whether thermoelectric cooler is installed or not, which changes the output wavelength of the laser (Lee M. S. et al., 2017). However, other characteristics also vary as temperature increases. These variations may help the eavesdropper in practical quantum key distribution systems. We study the effects of temperature increase on gain-switched semiconductor lasers by simulating temperature dependent rate equations. The results show that temperature increase may cause large intensity fluctuation, decrease the output intensity and lead the signal state and decoy state distinguishable. We also propose a modified photon number splitting attack by exploiting the effects of temperature increase. Countermeasures are also proposed.
arXiv commentAccepted by Optics Communications. 7 Figures
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