Partially random phase attack to the practical two-way quantum-key-distribution system
arXiv:1305.5985 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.85.032304
Abstract
Phase randomization is a very important assumption in the Bennett-Brassard 1984 quantum key distribution (QKD) system with a weak coherent source. Thus an active phase modulator is needed to randomize the phase of source. However, it is hard to check whether the phase of source is randomized totally or not in practical QKD systems. In this paper a partially random phase attack is proposed to exploit this imperfection. Our analysis shows that Eve can break the security of a two-way QKD system by using our attack, even if an active phase randomization is adopted by Alice. Furthermore, the numerical simulation shows that in some parameter regimes, our attack is immune to the one-decoy-state method.
9pages,7figures
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