Risk and interaction aversion: screening mechanisms in the Prisoner's Dilemma game
arXiv:1708.06844 · doi:10.1007/s10955-017-1873-0
Abstract
When the interactions between cooperators (C) and defectors (D) can be partially avoided within a population, there may be an overall enhancement of cooperation. One example of such screening mechanism occurs in the presence of risk-averse agents (loners, L) that are neutral towards others, i.e., both L and its opponent, whatever its strategy, receive the same payoff. Their presence in the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game sustains the coexistence of cooperators and defectors far beyond the level attained in their absence. Another screening mechanism is a heterogeneous landscape obtained, for example, by site diluting the lattice. In this case, cooperation is enhanced with some fraction of such inactive, interaction-averse sites. By considering the interplay of both mechanisms, we show that there is an explosive increase in the range of densities, just above the percolation threshold, where neutrality is prevented and loners become extinct, the behavior reverting to the pure PD game. Interestingly, this occurs despite defectors being usually abundant in that region. This has to be compared with the corresponding loner-free region in the undiluted case that, besides being very small, is dominatedby cooperators.
8 pages
References in corpus (17)
- Evolutionary games on graphs
- Statistical physics of human cooperation
- Mobility promotes and jeopardizes biodiversity in rock-paper-scissors games
- Cyclic dominance in evolutionary games: A review
- Does mobility decrease cooperation?
- If players are sparse social dilemmas are too: Importance of percolation for evolution of cooperation
- Distortion and destruction of colloidal flocks in disordered environments
- Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game
- Percolation threshold determines the optimal population density for public cooperation
- Zealots tame oscillations in the spatial rock-paper-scissors game
- Effects of strategy-migration direction and noise in the evolutionary spatial prisoner's dilemma
- Reentrant phase transitions and defensive alliances in social dilemmas with informed strategies
- Biodiversity in models of cyclic dominance is preserved by heterogeneity in site-specific invasion rates
- Globally synchronized oscillations in complex cyclic games
- Cooperation percolation in spatial prisoner's dilemma game
- Percolation and cooperation with mobile agents: Geometric and strategy clusters
- Mobility, fitness collection, and the breakdown of cooperation