Some impossibilities of ranking in generalized tournaments

Abstract

In a generalized tournament, players may have an arbitrary number of matches against each other and the outcome of the games is measured on a cardinal scale with a lower and upper bound. An axiomatic approach is applied to the problem of ranking the competitors. Self-consistency requires assigning the same rank for players with equivalent results, while a player showing an obviously better performance than another should be ranked strictly higher. According to order preservation, if two players have the same pairwise ranking in two tournaments where the same players have played the same number of matches, then their pairwise ranking is not allowed to change in the aggregated tournament. We reveal that these two properties cannot be satisfied simultaneously on this universal domain.

This article draws from arXiv:1612.00186 in model setting and axioms. 14 pages, 3 figures

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