Randomness determines practical security of BB84 quantum key distribution
arXiv:1508.06396
Abstract
Unconditional security of the BB84 quantum key distribution protocol has been proved by exploiting the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics, but the practical quantum key distribution system maybe hacked by considering the imperfect state preparation and measurement respectively. Until now, different attacking schemes have been proposed by utilizing imperfect devices, but the general security analysis model against all of the practical attacking schemes has not been proposed. Here, we demonstrate that the general practical attacking schemes can be divided into the Trojan horse attack, strong randomness attack and weak randomness attack respectively. We prove security of BB84 protocol under randomness attacking models, and these results can be applied to guarantee the security of the practical quantum key distribution system.
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