Weak randomness completely trounces the security of QKD
arXiv:1206.1287 · doi:10.1103/PhysRevA.86.062308
Abstract
In usual security proofs of quantum protocols the adversary (Eve) is expected to have full control over any quantum communication between any communicating parties (Alice and Bob). Eve is also expected to have full access to an authenticated classical channel between Alice and Bob. Unconditional security against any attack by Eve can be proved even in the realistic setting of device and channel imperfection. In this Letter we show that the security of QKD protocols is ruined if one allows Eve to possess a very limited access to the random sources used by Alice. Such knowledge should always be expected in realistic experimental conditions via different side channels.
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- Attacking quantum key distribution by light injection via ventilation openings
- Physical Security in the Post-quantum Era: A Survey on Side-channel Analysis, Random Number Generators, and Physically Unclonable Functions
- Completely Device Independent Quantum Key Distribution
- Semi-device-independent randomness expansion with partially free random sources
- Bounds on semi-device-independent quantum random number expansion capabilities
- Device-independent randomness amplification with a single device
- Device-independent quantum key distribution based on measurement inputs
- Randomness determines practical security of BB84 quantum key distribution