The cost of attack in competing networks

Abstract

Real-world attacks can be interpreted as the result of competitive interactions between networks, ranging from predator-prey networks to networks of countries under economic sanctions. Although the purpose of an attack is to damage a target network, it also curtails the ability of the attacker, which must choose the duration and magnitude of an attack to avoid negative impacts on its own functioning. Nevertheless, despite the large number of studies on interconnected networks, the consequences of initiating an attack have never been studied. Here, we address this issue by introducing a model of network competition where a resilient network is willing to partially weaken its own resilience in order to more severely damage a less resilient competitor. The attacking network can take over the competitor nodes after their long inactivity. However, due to a feedback mechanism the takeovers weaken the resilience of the attacking network. We define a conservation law that relates the feedback mechanism to the resilience dynamics for two competing networks. Within this formalism, we determine the cost and optimal duration of an attack, allowing a network to evaluate the risk of initiating hostilities.

8 two-column pages, 6 figures, supplementary material; accepted for publication in Journal of the Royal Society Interface

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• Critical phenomena in complex networks
• The Matthew effect in empirical data
• Avoiding catastrophic failure in correlated networks of networks
• Systemic risk in dynamical networks with stochastic failure criterion

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