Providing Long-Term Participation Incentive in Participatory Sensing
arXiv:1501.02480 · doi:10.1109/INFOCOM.2015.7218673
Abstract
Providing an adequate long-term participation incentive is important for a participatory sensing system to maintain enough number of active users (sensors), so as to collect a sufficient number of data samples and support a desired level of service quality. In this work, we consider the sensor selection problem in a general time-dependent and location-aware participatory sensing system, taking the long-term user participation incentive into explicit consideration. We study the problem systematically under different information scenarios, regarding both future information and current information (realization). In particular, we propose a Lyapunov-based VCG auction policy for the on-line sensor selection, which converges asymptotically to the optimal off-line benchmark performance, even with no future information and under (current) information asymmetry. Extensive numerical results show that our proposed policy outperforms the state-of-art policies in the literature, in terms of both user participation (e.g., reducing the user dropping probability by 25% to 90%) and social performance (e.g., increasing the social welfare by 15% to 80%).
arXiv commentThis manuscript serves as the online technical report of the article published in IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM), 2015
References in corpus (1)
Cited by in corpus (13)
- Providing Long-Term Participation Incentive in Participatory Sensing
- CENTURION: Incentivizing Multi-Requester Mobile Crowd Sensing
- PS-Sim: A Framework for Scalable Simulation of Participatory Sensing Data
- Budget-Constrained Contract Design for Effort-Averse Sensors in Averaging Based Estimation
- Quality adaptive online double auction in participatory sensing
- A Budget Feasible Peer Graded Mechanism For IoT-Based Crowdsourcing
- A Double Auction Mechanism for Mobile Crowd Sensing with Data Reuse
- LEPA: Incentivizing Long-term Privacy-preserving Data Aggregation in Crowdsensing
- Small Profits and Quick Returns: An Incentive Mechanism Design for IoT-based Crowdsourcing under Continuous Platform Competition
- Performance Bound Analysis for Crowdsourced Mobile Video Streaming
- Sustainable Incentives for Mobile Crowdsensing: Auctions, Lotteries, and Trust and Reputation Systems
- Generalized Lottery Trees: Budget-Consistent Incentive Tree Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing
- Data-Centric Mobile Crowdsensing