The nucleolus of large majority games
arXiv:1310.0004 · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.041
Abstract
Members of a shareholder meeting or legislative committee have greater or smaller voting power than meets the eye if the nucleolus of the induced majority game differs from the voting weight distribution. We establish a new sufficient condition for the weight and power distributions to be equal; and we characterize the limit behavior of the nucleolus in case all relative weights become small.
8 pages; a few typos have been corrected
References in corpus (1)
Cited by in corpus (6)
- The inverse problem for power distributions in committees
- Bounds for the Nakamura number
- Pseudo Polynomial Size LP Formulation for Calculating the Least Core Value of Weighted Voting Games
- A note on limit results for the Penrose-Banzhaf index
- Representation-Compatible Power Indices
- The average representation - a cornucopia of power indices?