Bounds for the Nakamura number
arXiv:1711.06611 · doi:10.1007/s00355-018-1164-y
Abstract
The Nakamura number is an appropriate invariant of a simple game to study the existence of social equilibria and the possibility of cycles. For symmetric quota games its number can be obtained by an easy formula. For some subclasses of simple games the corresponding Nakamura number has also been characterized. However, in general, not much is known about lower and upper bounds depending of invariants on simple, complete or weighted games. Here, we survey such results and highlight connections with other game theoretic concepts.
arXiv comment23 pages, 3 tables; a few more references added
References in corpus (6)
- On minimum sum representations for weighted voting games
- Minimal proper non-IRUP instances of the one-dimensional Cutting Stock Problem
- Dimension of the Lisbon voting rules in the EU Council: a challenge and new world record
- The nucleolus of large majority games
- On minimum integer representations of weighted games
- Simple Games versus Weighted Voting Games