20 citations · 95 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for
11 papers
The Art and Beauty of Voting Power
Sascha Kurz, Alexander Mayer, Stefan Napel
We exhibit the hidden beauty of weighted voting and voting power by applying a generalization of the Penrose-Banzhaf index to social choice rules. Three players who have multiple v…
Influence in Weighted Committees
Sascha Kurz, Alexander Mayer, Stefan Napel
A committee's decisions on more than two alternatives much depend on the adopted voting method, and so does the distribution of power among the committee members. We investigate ho…
The roll call interpretation of the Shapley value
Sascha Kurz, Stefan Napel
The Shapley value is commonly illustrated by roll call votes in which players support or reject a proposal in sequence. If all sequences are equiprobable, a voter's Shapley value c…
Weighted Committee Games
Sascha Kurz, Alexander Mayer, Stefan Napel
Many binary collective choice situations can be described as weighted simple voting games. We introduce weighted committee games to model decisions on an arbitrary number of altern…
Fair Representation and a Linear Shapley Rule
Sascha Kurz, Nicola Maaser, Stefan Napel
When delegations to an assembly or council represent differently sized constituencies, they are often allocated voting weights which increase in population numbers (EU Council, US…
Dimension of the Lisbon voting rules in the EU Council: a challenge and new world record
Sascha Kurz, Stefan Napel
The new voting system of the Council of the European Union cannot be represented as the intersection of six or fewer weighted games, i.e., its dimension is at least 7. This sets a…