Distinguishing initial state-vectors from each other in histories formulations and the PBR argument
arXiv:1211.2084 · doi:10.1007/s10701-013-9759-8
Abstract
Following the argument of Pusey, Barrett and Rudolph (Nature Phys. 8:476, 2012), new interest has been raised on whether one can interpret state-vectors (pure states) in a statistical way (-epistemic theories), or if each of them corresponds to a different ontological entity. Each interpretation of quantum theory assumes different ontology and one could ask if the PBR argument carries over. Here we examine this question for histories formulations in general with particular attention to the co-event formulation. State-vectors appear as the initial state that enters into the quantum measure. While the PBR argument goes through up to a point, the failure to meet some of the assumptions they made does not allow one to reach their conclusion. However, the author believes that the "statistical interpretation" is still impossible for co-events even if this is not proven by the PBR argument.
arXiv comment25 pages, v2 published version
References in corpus (17)
- Classical Equations for Quantum Systems
- On the reality of the quantum state
- Quantum Mechanics as Quantum Measure Theory
- On the Consistent Histories Approach to Quantum Mechanics
- Properties of Consistent Histories
- Consistent Sets Yield Contrary Inferences in Quantum Theory
- Quantum Dynamics without the Wave Function
- An exercise in "anhomomorphic logic"
- Anomalies of weakened decoherence criteria for quantum histories
- Decoherent Histories Quantum Mechanics with One 'Real' Fine-Grained History
- No-go theorems for ψ-epistemic models based on a continuity assumption
- Quantum Mechanics with Extended Probabilities
- Quantum measure and integration theory
- The emergence of probabilities in anhomomorphic logic
- Dynamics & Predictions in the Co-Event Interpretation
- Quantum measures and the coevent interpretation
- The coevent formulation of quantum theory