Attack of Many Eavesdroppers via Optimal Strategy in Quantum Cryptography

Abstract

We examine a situation that $n$ eavesdroppers attack the Bennett-Brassard cryptographic protocol via their own optimal and symmetric strategies. Information gain and mutual information with sender for each eavesdropper are explicitly derived. The receiver's error rate for the case of arbitrary $n$ eavesdroppers can be derived using a recursive relation. Although first eavesdropper can get mutual information without disturbance arising due to other eavesdroppers, subsequent eavesdropping generally increases the receiver's error rate. Other eavesdroppers cannot gain information on the input signal sufficiently. As a result, the information each eavesdropper gains becomes less than optimal one.

17 pages, 8 figures

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