On the transition to efficiency in Minority Games

Abstract

The existence of a phase transition with diverging susceptibility in batch Minority Games (MGs) is the mark of informationally efficient regimes and is linked to the specifics of the agents' learning rules. Here we study how the standard scenario is affected in a mixed population game in which agents with the `optimal' learning rule (i.e. the one leading to efficiency) coexist with ones whose adaptive dynamics is sub-optimal. Our generic finding is that any non-vanishing intensive fraction of optimal agents guarantees the existence of an efficient phase. Specifically, we calculate the dependence of the critical point on the fraction $q$ of `optimal' agents focusing our analysis on three cases: MGs with market impact correction, grand-canonical MGs and MGs with heterogeneous comfort levels.

12 pages, 3 figures; contribution to the special issue "Viewing the World through Spin Glasses" in honour of David Sherrington on the occasion of his 65th birthday

References in corpus (6)

• Statistical mechanics of systems with heterogeneous agents: Minority Games
• Criticality and finite size effects in a simple realistic model of stock market
• Generating Functional Analysis of the Dynamics of the Batch Minority Game with Random External Information
• Continuum time limit and stationary states of the Minority Game
• Broken ergodicity and memory in the minority game
• Strategy correlations and timing of adaptation in Minority Games

Cited by in corpus (5)

• Statistical Mechanics of Competitive Resource Allocation using Agent-based Models
• Optimal coordination of resources: A solution from reinforcement learning
• Transition in the Waiting-Time Distribution of Price-Change Events in a Global Socioeconomic System
• Self-organized global control of carbon emissions
• Structure-preserving desynchronization of minority games