24 citations
Counting papers with at most 25 authors, so collaboration author lists do not stand in for the people here.
- Queen's University BelfastGB3 papers
- Pforzheim University of Applied SciencesDE2 papers
- Centre for Economic Policy ResearchGB1 paper
- Collegio Carlo AlbertoIT1 paper
- Colorado State UniversityUS1 paper
- Erasmus University RotterdamNL1 paper
- Georgia Institute of TechnologyUS1 paper
- Pennsylvania State UniversityUS1 paper
- University of East AngliaGB1 paper
- University of MannheimDE1 paper
- University of NottinghamGB1 paper
8 papers
The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
Josue Ortega, Thilo Klein
We compare the outcomes of the most prominent strategy-proof and stable algorithm (Deferred Acceptance, DA) and the most prominent strategy-proof and Pareto optimal algorithm (Top…
A Knowledge Graph for Assessing Aggressive Tax Planning Strategies
Niklas Lüdemann, Ageda Shiba, Nikolaos Thymianis +3
The taxation of multi-national companies is a complex field, since it is influenced by the legislation of several states. Laws in different states may have unforeseen interaction e…
School choice with independent versus consolidated districts
Thilo Klein, Robert Aue, Josue Ortega
This paper studies the welfare effects of school district consolidation. Using incomplete rank-ordered lists (ROLs) submitted for admission to the Hungarian secondary school system…
Externalities in Knowledge Production: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment
Marit Hinnosaar, Toomas Hinnosaar, Michael Kummer +1
Are there positive or negative externalities in knowledge production? Do current contributions to knowledge production increase or decrease the future growth of knowledge? We use a…
The Losses from Integration in Matching Markets can be Large
Josué Ortega
Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst-case scenarios in which these…
Social Integration in Two-Sided Matching Markets
Josue Ortega
When several two-sided matching markets merge into one, it is inevitable that some agents will become worse off if the matching mechanism used is stable. I formalize this observati…
Multi-unit Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences
Josue Ortega
I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider o…
A randomness test for functional panels
Piotr Kokoszka, Matthew Reimherr, Nikolas Wölfing
Functional panels are collections of functional time series, and arise often in the study of high frequency multivariate data. We develop a portmanteau style test to determine if t…