24 citations · 63 across the 9 of their papers we have counts for
13 papers
A Note on the Strategic Vulnerability of the Boston Mechanism in Random Markets
Josue Ortega
We provide the first asymptotic analysis of the Boston Mechanism under equilibrium play in random markets. We provide two results. First, while 63\% of students receive their first…
The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
Josue Ortega, Thilo Klein
We compare the outcomes of the most prominent strategy-proof and stable algorithm (Deferred Acceptance, DA) and the most prominent strategy-proof and Pareto optimal algorithm (Top…
School choice with independent versus consolidated districts
Thilo Klein, Robert Aue, Josue Ortega
This paper studies the welfare effects of school district consolidation. Using incomplete rank-ordered lists (ROLs) submitted for admission to the Hungarian secondary school system…
On the integration of Shapley-Scarf housing markets
Rajnish Kunar, Kriti Manocha, Josue Ortega
We study the welfare consequences of merging Shapley--Scarf markets. Market integration can lead to large welfare losses and make the vast majority of agents worse-off, but is on a…
Fairness and Efficiency in Cake-Cutting with Single-Peaked Preferences
Bhavook Bhardwaj, Rajnish Kumar, Josue Ortega
We study the cake-cutting problem when agents have single-peaked preferences over the cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang-Wu (2019) to obtain envy-free allocat…
Obvious Manipulations in Cake-Cutting
Josue Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi
In cake-cutting, strategy-proofness is a very costly requirement in terms of fairness: for n=2 it implies a dictatorial allocation, whereas for n > 2 it requires that one agent rec…
The Losses from Integration in Matching Markets can be Large
Josué Ortega
Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst-case scenarios in which these…
Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice
Maria Kyropoulou, Josué Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi
Using a lab experiment, we investigate the real-life performance of envy-free and proportional cake-cutting procedures with respect to fairness and preference manipulation. We find…
Integration in Social Networks
Josue Ortega
We propose the notion of -integration as a measure of equality of opportunity in social networks. A social network is -integrated if there is a path of length at most bet…
The Strength of Absent Ties: Social Integration via Online Dating
Josue Ortega, Philipp Hergovich
We used to marry people to whom we were somehow connected. Since we were more connected to people similar to us, we were also likely to marry someone from our own race. However, on…
Social Integration in Two-Sided Matching Markets
Josue Ortega
When several two-sided matching markets merge into one, it is inevitable that some agents will become worse off if the matching mechanism used is stable. I formalize this observati…
Multi-unit Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences
Josue Ortega
I study the problem of allocating objects among agents without using money. Agents can receive several objects and have dichotomous preferences, meaning that they either consider o…
Playing Tennis without Envy
Josue Ortega
A group of friends organize their tennis games by submitting each their availability over the weekdays. They want to obtain an assignment such that: each game must be a double tenn…