4 papers
Fairness and Efficiency in Cake-Cutting with Single-Peaked Preferences
Bhavook Bhardwaj, Rajnish Kumar, Josue Ortega
We study the cake-cutting problem when agents have single-peaked preferences over the cake. We show that a recently proposed mechanism by Wang-Wu (2019) to obtain envy-free allocat…
Obvious Manipulations in Cake-Cutting
Josue Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi
In cake-cutting, strategy-proofness is a very costly requirement in terms of fairness: for n=2 it implies a dictatorial allocation, whereas for n > 2 it requires that one agent rec…
The Losses from Integration in Matching Markets can be Large
Josué Ortega
Although the integration of two-sided matching markets using stable mechanisms generates expected gains from integration, I show that there are worst-case scenarios in which these…
Integration in Social Networks
Josue Ortega
We propose the notion of -integration as a measure of equality of opportunity in social networks. A social network is -integrated if there is a path of length at most bet…