862 citations
Counting papers with at most 25 authors, so collaboration author lists do not stand in for the people here.
- Korea UniversityKR30 papers
- Asia Pacific Center for Theoretical PhysicsKR25 papers
- Sungkyunkwan UniversityKR14 papers
- Korea Advanced Institute of Science and TechnologyKR12 papers
- Advanced Science Research CenterJP10 papers
- Japan Atomic Energy AgencyJP10 papers
- Korea Institute for Advanced StudyKR10 papers
- RIKEN Center for Computational ScienceJP10 papers
- Hanyang UniversityKR8 papers
- Institute for Basic ScienceKR8 papers
- Sejong UniversityKR8 papers
- The University of OsakaJP8 papers
15 papers · 1 filter
Threshold behavior of a social norm in response to error proneness
Quang Anh Le, Seung Ki Baek
A social norm defines what is good and what is bad in social contexts, as well as what to do based on such assessments. A stable social norm should be maintained against errors com…
Evolution of direct reciprocity in group-structured populations
Yohsuke Murase, Christian Hilbe, Seung Ki Baek
People tend to have their social interactions with members of their own community. Such group-structured interactions can have a profound impact on the behaviors that evolve. Group…
Social norms in indirect reciprocity with ternary reputations
Yohsuke Murase, Minjae Kim, Seung Ki Baek
Indirect reciprocity is a key mechanism that promotes cooperation in social dilemmas by means of reputation. Although it has been a common practice to represent reputations by bina…
Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity
Sanghun Lee, Yohsuke Murase, Seung Ki Baek
Reputation is a powerful mechanism to enforce cooperation among unrelated individuals through indirect reciprocity, but it suffers from disagreement originating from private assess…
Assortative clustering in a one-dimensional population with replication strategies
Sunhee Chae, Nahyeon Lee, Seung Ki Baek +1
In a geographically distributed population, assortative clustering plays an important role in evolution by modifying local environments. To examine its effects in a linear habitat,…
Win-Stay-Lose-Shift as a self-confirming equilibrium in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Minjae Kim, Jung-Kyoo Choi, Seung Ki Baek
Evolutionary game theory assumes that players replicate a highly scored player's strategy through genetic inheritance. However, when learning occurs culturally, it is often difficu…
Five rules for friendly rivalry in direct reciprocity
Yohsuke Murase, Seung Ki Baek
Direct reciprocity is one of the key mechanisms accounting for cooperation in our social life. According to recent understanding, most of classical strategies for direct reciprocit…
Automata representation of successful strategies for social dilemmas
Yohsuke Murase, Seung Ki Baek
In a social dilemma, cooperation is collectively optimal, yet individually each group member prefers to defect. A class of successful strategies of direct reciprocity were recently…
Sex-ratio bias induced by mutation
Minjae Kim, Hyeong-Chai Jeong, Seung Ki Baek
A question in evolutionary biology is why the number of males is approximately equal to that of females in many species, and Fisher's theory of equal investment answers that it is…
Long-range prisoner's dilemma game on a cycle
Jiwon Bahk, Seung Ki Baek, Hyeong-Chai Jeong
We investigate evolutionary dynamics of altruism with long-range interaction on a cycle. The interaction between individuals is described by a simplified version of the prisoner's…
Seven rules to avoid the tragedy of the commons
Yohsuke Murase, Seung Ki Baek
Cooperation among self-interested players in a social dilemma is fragile and easily interrupted by mistakes. In this work, we study the repeated -person public-goods game and se…
Chaos and unpredictability in evolution of cooperation in continuous time
Taekho You, Minji Kwon, Hang-Hyun Jo +2
Cooperators benefit others with paying costs. Evolution of cooperation crucially depends on the cost-benefit ratio of cooperation, denoted as . In this work, we investigate the…
Duality between cooperation and defection in the presence of tit-for-tat in replicator dynamics
Seung Ki Baek, Su Do Yi, Hyeong-Chai Jeong
The prisoner's dilemma describes a conflict between a pair of players, in which defection is a dominant strategy whereas cooperation is collectively optimal. The iterated version o…
Combination with anti-tit-for-tat remedies problems of tit-for-tat
Su Do Yi, Seung Ki Baek, Jung-Kyoo Choi
One of the most important questions in game theory concerns how mutual cooperation can be achieved and maintained in a social dilemma. In Axelrod's tournaments of the iterated pris…
Comparing reactive and memory-one strategies of direct reciprocity
Seung Ki Baek, Hyeong-Chai Jeong, Christian Hilbe +1
Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation based on repeated interactions. When individuals meet repeatedly, they can use conditional strategies to enforce…