5.2k citations
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Showing 2012 · cs.GTShow all
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cs.GT2012★ 5 cited
Envy Freedom and Prior-free Mechanism Design
Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline, Qiqi Yan
We consider the provision of an abstract service to single-dimensional agents. Our model includes position auctions, single-minded combinatorial auctions, and constrained matching…
cs.GT2012★ 2 cited
Efficiency-Revenue Trade-offs in Auctions
Ilias Diakonikolas, Christos Papadimitriou, George Pierrakos +1
When agents with independent priors bid for a single item, Myerson's optimal auction maximizes expected revenue, whereas Vickrey's second-price auction optimizes social welfare. We…