2 citations · 4 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers · 1 filter
Undetectable Selfish Mining
Maryam Bahrani, S. Matthew Weinberg
Seminal work of Eyal and Sirer (2014) establishes that a strategic Bitcoin miner may strictly profit by deviating from the intended Bitcoin protocol, using a strategy now termed *s…
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design with Active Block Producers
Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden
The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with *passive* block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards e…
When Bidders Are DAOs
Maryam Bahrani, Pranav Garimidi, Tim Roughgarden
In a typical decentralized autonomous organization (DAO), people organize themselves into a group that is programmatically managed. DAOs can act as bidders in auctions, with a DAO'…